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This exploratory study examines the role of listening and mental models for ethical decision-
making. A model on listening is presented based on a review of the literature. The model 
proposes that the effectiveness of a decision-maker’s listening impacts how much data the 
decision-maker can access from stakeholders and how much of that data the decision-maker 
will accurately understand. This can affect the decision-maker’s ability to fill in own blind spots 
and consider stakeholders’ interests and concerns when making decisions. The model also 
proposes that the effectiveness of a decision-maker’s listening can affect a stakeholder’s 
psychological safety and basic needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, thereby 
affecting the stakeholder’s well-being and the degree to which they feel they can express their 
true selves. A case study is then presented based on the decision-making that led to the two fatal 
Boeing 737 Max accidents. Findings from the case illustrate how key decision-makers at 
Boeing seem to have been narrowly focused on only a few stakeholders and dimensions of the 
competitive challenge they had to solve. Financial pressure, ineffective listening to employees, 
and lack of self-awareness are discussed as potential explanations for why decision-makers at 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for the study 
All of us see the world differently. Our perception is shaped by our experiences, attitudes, and 
beliefs, and we constantly filter incoming data through our mental models of the world. 
Although this enables us to navigate our surroundings effortlessly, it also leaves us vulnerable 
to drawing premature conclusions based on faulty assumptions. 
For trivial decisions, relying exclusively on our own perception is usually sufficient. However, 
in an organizational setting, when decisions increase in complexity and importance, our 
responsibility for acquiring an accurate understanding of the problem at hand increases. 
Because if we fail to fill in our blind spots, we risk making narrow-minded decisions that inflict 
negative externalities on stakeholders who depend on us.  
However, as our natural inclination is to distort data to fit our pre-existing beliefs, expanding 
our understanding with new perspectives could be challenging. We tend to evaluate input from 
others through our own subjective lens, immediately assessing whether we agree or disagree 
with the perspectives they share. Listening in this way, with judgment, could deprive us of 
enlightening insights and deprive others of feeling understood. It could cause us to miss each 
other in psychological space, leaving us feeling frustrated, estranged, and disconnected. 
If we, on the other hand, are able to temporarily suspend our judgment, we can listen with the 
intent to understand others, entering their subjective world to see the world as they see it. 
Although it is important not to lose our sense of self during the process, which could lead to 
neglecting our own experiences and values, this way of listening might leave us with a better 
understanding of the perspectives and positions of others. If we ought to make ethical decisions 
that take into consideration the interests and concerns of those around us, this might be an 
important ability to acquire.  
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1.2 Research question 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the role of listening and mental models for ethical 
decision-making. Scholars have extensively studied each of these topics separately, yet there 
seems to be a lack of studies on how these topics relate. My intent is to examine this abandoned 
crossroad in order to contribute to the literature by exploring how these topics might intertwine. 
Before proceeding, I will introduce three key terms used in this thesis. 
Mental models refer to how our attitudes, beliefs, experiences, and limited cognitive abilities 
influence how we perceive the world around us. 
Effective listening refers to our ability to gain an understanding of how others perceive the 
world. By reducing our judgment, we can listen in a way that enables us to see the world as 
someone else sees it and potentially be changed by it. It is also about our self-awareness, 
meaning we can listen to ourselves—our inner flow of experience—to get a better 
understanding of how our own filters distort our perception of reality. 
Ethical decision-making refers to our ability to make decisions that go beyond our narrow self-
interest by realizing that we have blind spots and cognitive shortcomings that can lure us into 
making decisions that are both narrow-minded and irresponsible. It indicates our ability to 
consider long-term consequences of our actions and take responsibility for a wide set of 
stakeholders on a broad set of dimensions. 
There are many ways of examining these three topics. In this thesis, I focus primarily on the 
relationship between manager and employee. This relationship is particularly interesting 
because managers and employees usually have different responsibilities, competencies, and 
interests that cause them to perceive things differently. These different perceptions often create 
a basis for conflict, especially when employees feel that their concerns are not taken into 
consideration. Yet I go beyond this relationship to consider how effective listening, both to 
ourselves and others, influences our ability to take responsibility for negative externalities that 
we otherwise would have been likely to inflict on other stakeholders. 
In order to study these issues, I first explore the research question based on a review of the 
literature before synthesizing my findings and presenting a research model. Thereafter, I 
consider the research question in light of the decision-making that led to the two fatal Boeing 
737 Max accidents. I do this by exploring how the listening skills and mental models of key 
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executives at the aircraft manufacturer Boeing and the American Federal Aviation Agency 
(FAA) affected their decision-making. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents the research design of the thesis.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature related to mental models, listening, and ethical decision-
making.  
Chapter 4 synthesizes the findings from the literature review and proposes a research model on 
listening.  
Chapter 5 details the background information for the Boeing 737 Max case study. Findings 
from a thematic analysis of an investigation report of the 737 Max accidents and a content 
analysis of Boeing’s annual reports are also presented.  
Chapter 6 offers a discussion of the case. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by presenting implications and sharing ideas for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Research design 
This chapter will show the overall approach to how the research question will be answered. The 
purpose of my research and the philosophical assumptions will be described. In the same 
manner, it will be displayed how I have carried out my research, and the reasons behind my 
choices will be explained. 
2.1 Purpose 
Several types of studies can be carried out, depending on the research question and the purpose 
of the study (Saunders et al., 2019). The purpose of this study is to explore the connections 
between listening, mental models, and ethical decision-making. Even though many scholars 
have written a lot on these topics separately, I have not been able to find much research on how 
they are related. Since I want to explore the intersection between these topics—understanding 
their interrelatedness better and in more depth—I consider my research to be explorative. My 
study will, however, also involve descriptive elements that characterize a situation or a 
phenomenon. Based on this study, I can make no definitive claims on the causality between 
different variables, but I can suggest relationships that might exist. 
2.2 Philosophical stance 
In all parts of the research process, researchers make assumptions and choices based on their 
beliefs about how knowledge should be created (Saunders et al., 2019). This set of assumptions 
and beliefs is called research philosophy, and influences how the researcher understands their 
research, their choice of research methods, and how they interpret their findings.  
There are several paradigms of research philosophy. Two of the most influential paradigms are 
positivism and interpretivism. Positivism asserts that there exists one universally true, external 
reality (Saunders et al., 2019). Within this paradigm, knowledge is usually developed using the 
scientific method, finding causal explanations through observations and measurements. The 
researcher should be objective and neutral, and not interfere with the research process. This 
usually leads to deductive, quantitative research methods. 
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Interpretivism, on the other hand, asserts that reality is socially constructed, and that there 
therefore are multiple meanings and interpretations that can be made and that might be equally 
valid (Saunders et al., 2019). Reality is understood through people’s narratives and how they 
give meaning to the world around them. The researcher’s subjectivity always influences the 
research process, and objectivity and independence of the research process is not possible. This 
philosophy usually leads to inductive, qualitative research methods. 
There is no need to commit to one of these paradigms. I will instead take a pragmatic approach 
and let my research question, as well as practical constraints, drive my choices. Listening, 
mental models, and ethical decision-making are topics that are quite subjective by nature. They 
are about how we make sense of the world around us, how we can tap into the perspectives of 
others and understand their point of view, and how we make decisions based on our own values, 
beliefs, and experiences. Furthermore, most of the research on these topics is of a qualitative 
nature, and mostly consists of textual data. In addition, exploring how these topics are related 
requires me to take an active role in the research process. My judgments about what is relevant 
literature, my interpretations of findings and how they connect to the literature, will influence 
the conclusions I reach. Based on these factors, my research will have clear characteristics of 
the interpretive paradigm.  
These topics could also have been explored from a positivist paradigm, at least separately. 
Neuroscientific methods are, for example, promising for figuring out more about what happens 
in our brain when we listen and make decisions. Based on my time constraints and competence, 
however, such an approach is not fruitful for my thesis. 
2.3 Approach to theory development 
Another aspect of the research design is the approach to theory development, which may be 
seen as either inductive, deductive, or abductive. The approach used often follows from the 
philosophical stance.   
A deductive approach relies on established theory and often attempts to falsify it (Saunders et 
al., 2019). It goes from a general observation to something specific. If the premises are true, the 
conclusion is also true. An inductive approach, on the other hand, does not rely on established 
theory, but instead attempts to create new theory based on the data that is gathered. It goes from 
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a specific observation and attempts to say something more general based on it. This observation 
cannot guarantee that what has been observed will be true in general.  
Abductive research is a more pragmatic approach, which switches between deduction and 
induction to find the most likely explanation (Dudovskiy, n.d.). It is suitable for both building 
and modifying existing theory (Saunders et al., 2019). In this study, I rely on existing theory on 
all three topics I am exploring, while searching for new connections. I therefore consider my 
research to be abductive. My overall approach does, however, also have a clear resemblance to 
eclecticism, which involves combining ideas and theories from a broad range of sources without 
a commitment to a single theory or paradigm (Britannica, 2017). 
2.4 Methodological choice 
It is also normal to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative research. The main 
difference is that quantitative research generally analyzes numeric data, usually numbers, while 
qualitative research generally analyzes non-numeric data, usually text (Saunders et al., 2019; 
Grønmo, 2020). However, research designs can also incorporate both types of studies. 
My research is a mixed methods study. It is mainly qualitative, since I base my research on a 
lot of textual documentation. But I also supplement my research with a quantitative approach 
based on an interesting observation I found during my case study. This is in line with my 
pragmatic philosophical stance. 
2.5 Research strategy 
The next aspect to consider is the choice of research strategy, which is the practical plan of how 
the research question should be answered (Saunders et al., 2019). I will now explain the two 
strategies of this thesis. 
2.5.1 Narrative literature review 
First, a narrative literature review will be used. A narrative literature review is suitable for 
identifying weaknesses in a particular field, to evaluate research, to provide an overview of the 
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current state of the theory, and to develop new theory (Baumeister & Leary, 1997). One 
advantage of a narrative literature review is that it can explore a broader set of questions than 
any one empirical study can. A single study will, in most cases, not have sufficient data to make 
broad conclusions about a particular theme. This means that there are knowledge gaps that no 
single study can fill alone. A narrative review can overcome this limitation and fill the 
knowledge gap by searching for connections across different studies. This can allow for new 
theories and hypotheses to be developed (Baumeister & Leary, 1997). 
Narrative reviews differ from systematic reviews. Systematic reviews use a highly structured, 
predefined, and reproduceable approach for collection and summarization of different research 
studies (Greenhalgh et al., 2018). Narrative reviews, on the other hand, do not have the same 
rigidity. In a narrative review, the researcher is also an active part of the process and contributes 
to theory development and understanding by summarizing and interpreting the literature.   
Since the purpose of my research is to figure out more about the relatedness between three 
distinct topics, I consider a narrative review to be the most effective way to explore my research 
question. It will give me the flexibility to look for relatedness between three fields of study that 
are otherwise rarely connected in research papers. The purpose of my review is both to give an 
overview of the current theory, but also to synthesize the findings and contribute to the literature 
by advancing the understanding of these topics. 
2.5.2 Case study 
The second strategy I will use is a case study. Case studies often explore a topic in a real-life 
setting (Saunders et al., 2019). By looking at the dynamics between the topic and the real life-
context, new insights can be found and become the basis for development of theory and new 
hypotheses. A case study can consist of one or more cases. Usually, a single case study is used 
when there is some uniqueness to the case, while a multiple case study is preferred to see if 
similar findings can be replicated across cases. 
The case I have chosen is the Boeing 737 Max scandal, where financial-focused decision-
making led to two fatal accidents, killing 346 individuals. In this case, I explore how the 
listening skills and mental models of managers at Boeing and the FAA, who had regulatory 
authority over Boeing, contributed to the decisions they made from the beginning of the 
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development process of the Max to the aftermath of the accidents, a time span of eight years, 
from 2011 to 2019. 
There are several reasons for choosing this case. First, as a quite new case, it has not yet been 
over-researched. Second, it seemingly contains many of the characteristics of listening issues, 
unethical decision-making, as well as narrow-minded thinking. Third, there is a lot of 
documentation publicly available that facilitates the research of this case. Fourth, I have an 
interest in and experience from the aviation industry, where I have worked as an air traffic 
controller since 2014. Because a main issue in this case is the balance between safety and 
financial focus, I can put both my safety experience from the real world and the knowledge I 
have acquired from my studies of economics and management to use. Even though this may 
give me some advantage in understanding the dynamics within the case, there is a real risk that 
my safety experience, which is an ingrained part of me, will lead to biases in my interpretations. 
However, I attempt to minimize them. There are several explanations and interpretations that 
can be made of the same case depending on who researches it. Accordingly, the readers of my 
analysis may make up their own opinions.  
My study is based on a single case. I think the case study complements the literature review by 
showing how these concepts can unfold in a real-life setting. Still, similar accidents have 
happened previously in other organizations, and I would have preferred to have used a multiple 
case study design. Due to time and work capacity constraints, such a wider approach was not a 
feasible solution.  
2.6 Data collection and analysis  
2.6.1 Narrative literature review 
For the literature review, I collected data in an unsystematic manner through Google Scholar 
and Oria. I did not follow any predetermined search protocol or strict selection criteria, but 
instead chose papers based on my own judgment of whether they seemed to be relevant to my 
research question. I attempted to primarily select peer-reviewed research papers, as well as 
books written by authors that also have published high-quality peer-reviewed research. In some 
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instances, however, I selected other papers because they contributed with valuable insights to 
my research question. 
The point of departure for my literature search was the readings I had done on Carl Rogers’ 
books on client-centered therapy and empathetic listening. In addition, I considered papers on 
psychological safety and bounded rationality to be of interest. My first selection of literature 
was therefore Rogers’ books. Subsequently, I made searches with keywords like “empathic 
listening”, “listening with understanding”, “perspective taking”, and “active listening” to find 
other supplementary literature on listening. I was especially interested in finding newer 
research, but my general impression eventually became that little empirical research on 
listening has been made. 
During my readings I eventually decided on how to structure my review. I concluded that 
understanding the relationship between decision-making and listening also requires an 
understanding of how we perceive ourselves and the world around us. This caused me to tweak 
my research question to include something on our own subjectivity: our mental models. 
Ultimately, I created three distinct sections: i) how we perceive the world around us, ii) how 
listening can or cannot lead us to perceive the world differently, and iii) ethical decision-
making. To find papers related to these sections, I used keywords like “ethical decision-
making”, “mental models”, and “self-concept”. During the literature review, I also found many 
references to other papers that I thought could be relevant. This led me to include topics like 
attitudes, employee voice and self-determination theory, as well as including additional papers 
related to other themes. 
The intention of my research was to explore a different question than the research papers 
themselves addressed. The purpose of including these papers was to see if they indirectly 
addressed concepts related to listening, even though listening was not the direct scope of their 
research. I do not methodologically critique or review each paper included. Instead, I look for 
relationships between the different parts of the literature to gain insight into how they are 
related. To some extent, my literature review shares some characteristics of meta-ethnographic 
syntheses that attempt to produce new meaning beyond the scope of individual studies (France 
et al., 2019). The different sections of the review can be distinguished as three parts that I 
attempt to synthesize to create a new holistic understanding. The synthesis occurs in chapter 4, 
where I propose my research model based on the review. 
10 
 
2.6.2 Case study 
The 737 Max case spans between 2011, when the development of the aircraft started, and 2019, 
when the second crash happened. My research depends on secondary data, which is data that 
has already been collected by someone else for some other purpose (Saunders et al., 2019). The 
case has been thoroughly investigated, and there are a lot of publicly available documents 
related to this case from dependent sources. Specifically, The House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, which is a committee of the United States House of 
Representatives that has jurisdiction over all US transportation (The House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, n.d.), has published transcribed interviews with key decision-
makers, internal communication documents, such as emails and surveys, from both Boeing and 
the FAA, as well as their own holistic report, in which they have analyzed contributing factors 
to the accidents and included the most important findings from their investigation.  
I have based most of my own research on the final report of the committee because it includes 
some of the most relevant material and provides a total overview of what happened. It includes 
interpretations and commentary from the authors of the report, which may contribute to 
understanding the narrative. I have also familiarized myself with other documents and sources 
related to the case to get a better understanding of it and to cross-check claims that are made. I 
have included some of these documents in my analysis because they contained valuable data.  
I have performed a thematic analysis to gain insight into the report. A thematic analysis is a 
method used to identify themes across a data set (Saunders et al., 2019). The approach is flexible 
and can be used for a variety of types of qualitative research, regardless of whether it is 
deductive, inductive, or abductive. I considered this to be an appropriate choice because it 
enabled me to systematically search for patterns related to the three key topics my research is 
about and to look for new associated themes. Although I performed this thematic analysis, my 
discussion about the case also incorporates other sources and findings. 
Due to a finding from the thematic analysis—a discrepancy between what managers said they 
prioritized and what they appeared to actually prioritize—I decided to add a quantitative content 
analysis of nine of Boeing’s annual reports. A content analysis is used to search for the presence 
of concepts, words, and themes within a text (Columbia Public Health, n.d.). There are different 
types of content analysis for various purposes. My purpose was to quantify the presence of 
“safe” and “$” within the annual reports to see if there was a pattern that could indicate what 
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managers at Boeing focused on. I was especially interested in finding whether there was a 
difference in the annual reports prior to the Max accidents compared to after the accidents. 
Therefore, I used a simple conceptual analysis of these explicit terms, where I counted the 
presence of the words I was looking for.  
2.6.2.1 Thematic analysis 
I performed the thematic analysis in the following way. As Saunders et al. (2019) state, the 
starting point is to become familiar with the data by reading through it several times and taking 
notes of recurring patterns. Thereafter, the data must be coded, which means giving different 
blocks of data, such as actions, thoughts, and beliefs, a label based on its meaning. Data that 
have similar meaning are given the same code. The approach to theory development influences 
how data is coded. Because my approach is abductive, I started the coding process with an idea 
of what I was looking for based on my literature review. Even though I had a sense of what I 
was looking for, I also let the content of the data direct my coding. I did this process manually 
by labelling data directly in the report, in addition to making a list of the codes that I used. I 
only coded the parts of the report that I thought were relevant to my research question.  
The next steps are searching for, refining, and naming themes (Saunders et al., 2019). Codes 
that have similar meaning are grouped together to form a broader theme. I did this by looking 
for similarities between the different codes on my list. I grouped codes that seemed to have 
similar meanings together and considered if they could function together as a coherent theme 
for later analysis. Some groupings seemed to fit well, while others did not. I therefore repeated 
this process several times until I was able to find the right relationship between the codes and 
how they could be grouped. I gave the different themes names based on what broad topic they 
were about. I then found the data that I had coded and put it under their respective theme. This 
led me to redefine certain themes to reduce overlap and to ensure they were sufficiently distinct. 
Some themes were redefined and collapsed into a single theme because of similarity in 
meaning. I also eventually chose to scrap a couple of themes that I had constructed because 
they were not sufficiently related to my research question. 
The last step is analyzing the themes and writing a coherent report that tells the story of the data 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). This includes showing the reader extracts of the data to illustrate how 
one has come to one’s conclusions, as well as arguing for how the data relates to the research 
question. I have done this in two steps. In the results section of the case study, I show examples 
of data from the report that illustrate how I have arrived at a certain theme. In the discussion 
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section of the case study, I analyze some of the findings and consider how they relate to my 
research question. However, the discussion section is not solely based on the thematic analysis, 
but also incorporates other elements, such as the content analysis and other material I found 
relevant. 
2.6.2.2 Content analysis 
The content analysis was performed as follows. First, the level of analysis was decided (is it a 
theme, concept, or word? See Public Health Colombia, n.d.). Since the content analysis only 
was a supplement to my other methods, I decided to keep the complexity low. Therefore, I only 
looked for the presence of the word “safe” and the symbol “$”. 
The next step was to decide whether I would distinguish between different forms of the word. 
I decided I would include all occurrences of words that started with “safe”. This meant that I 
also included words such as “safely” and “safety”. The “$” sign was only searched for in its 
original form. To keep the complexity low, I did not include words such as “dollars” or other 
terms or sentences that could have a similar conceptual meaning. 
Then I decided on the rules I would follow during the search process. The first rule was that I 
would exclude words that included “safe” that were referring to an organization or title. This 
excluded findings of “safe” in contexts such as “Board Aerospace Safety Committee” and 
“Chief Aerospace Safety Officer”. I also decided to exclude all mentions of “safety” that were 
used in the context of the Covid pandemic. This excluded findings of “safe” in contexts such 
as “new COVID-19 safety practices”.  
Thereafter, I chose which annual reports I would include in the analysis, altogether nine annual 
reports, from 2012 to 2020. I did not consider all parts of the reports to be relevant. The reports 
are more than a hundred pages long, but most of the pages are financial statements. I considered 
the pages where the management at Boeing addresses their stakeholders through text and 
pictures to be of interest, which occurs at the beginning of the reports. All the annual reports 
have a similar setup. I therefore decided that I would include all pages, including the front page, 
prior to the 10-K section of the reports. This reduced the number of pages I had to analyze to 
ten (annual reports 2012–2015), 14 (annual reports 2016–2019), and 18 (annual report 2020). 
Finally, I performed the actual search process using the search function in the Adobe Acrobat 
Reader. I manually went through each hit, and counted the occurrences of my search words, 
while excluding false hits and other hits that were affected by my exclusion criteria. 
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2.7 Research quality 
In this section, some aspects that impact the quality of my research will be accounted for. 
2.7.1 Narrative literature review 
My literature review has several weaknesses. First, I started this research with a clear interest 
in the subject of listening and with an implicit hypothesis that there most likely is a positive 
connection between ethical decision-making and listening. As a result, I have to a large extent 
been actively searching for literature that could confirm what I already believed to be true. Even 
though I have been aware of the potential negative effects of this confirmation bias during my 
research, this awareness has likely not been sufficient to overcome it. I have, however, actively 
attempted to look for contradicting literature, but I have not been successful at finding any clear 
indications that my hypotheses are wrong. This could, of course, be an indication that they have 
merit. Although I think there is a close relatedness between these concepts, and this also is 
supported my findings, there might be alternative explanations that could be more accurate. 
A second weakness is my literature search. The point of departure was my existing knowledge 
of listening primarily based on Rogers’ books, and biases in decision-making primarily based 
on the work of Kahneman and Tversky. Since I cannot search for things I do not know that 
exist, my literature search has been restricted to my own limited knowledge of these topics. I 
have, however, been able to acquire new knowledge during the process. I have therefore several 
times added papers and done new searches based on the new concepts I have been exposed to. 
In addition, my search technique has been quite arbitrary based on keywords I thought would 
lead to relevant results. A more proficient searcher would perhaps have been able to find both 
newer and more relevant literature. Moreover, I selected literature based on my own perception 
of whether it was suitable for my research purpose. While this has enabled me flexibility and 
allowed me to find literature quickly, there are most likely many valuable papers that I have not 
selected based on a wrong perception of their importance.  
A third weakness is my lack of distinction between empirical, theoretical, and anecdotal 
evidence. In a few instances, I have made clear what the specific paper I am referring to did 
methodologically. But in most cases I have not. This problem is perhaps most relevant to the 
listening section. Much of this section is based on Rogers’ books. While his books do contain 
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references to empirical research, they largely consist of his opinions based on his own 
experiences as a psychologist. Even though Rogers was a leading figure in his field and several 
other sources agree on the importance of empathic listening, this increases the uncertainty of 
the validness of the claims I make. However, I also think there is a big value in using these 
resources in my review. I find the perspectives Rogers brings to the table to be rich and 
insightful, even though not all of them have been empirically tested.  
Furthermore, as a researcher, I have been an active part of all steps of the process, making 
decisions on which literature to include, interpreting the literature, and putting the different 
parts together into a new whole. In essence, the developed synthesis/research model is my 
interpretation of how these concepts relate. Different researchers, doing similar processes, 
might have drawn other conclusions based on their experiences and perception of how these 
concepts intertwine.  
2.7.2 Case study 
The case study is heavily based on the investigation report of The House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, which is not an independent committee. In fact, it is a 
political committee that at the time of the investigation had a democratic majority. This means 
that the narrative that they create in the report could have been influenced by their political 
stance. However, I have cross-checked the report with other sources, and my personal 
conclusion is that their report is of high quality and can be trusted. For example, another report 
investigating the FAA was delivered by the U.S. Senate Committee On Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation. This committee had a republican majority at the time of the investigation. 
They find similar issues. In essence, I do not think the political element is troublesome. 
My decision to mainly base my analysis on the committee report is subject to some weaknesses. 
The report contains the committee’s own narrative, evaluations, and criticism of what happened 
at Boeing and the FAA. To back up their claims, they have included examples of internal 
communication at Boeing and FAA, such as emails, survey data and other documentation. Thus, 
my analysis is based not only on the internal communication itself, but also on the interpretation 
of the authors of the report. This makes me vulnerable not only to weaknesses in my own 
interpretation, but also to weaknesses in the interpretations and choices that they have made. 
This is partly mitigated, since the primary source material also is accessible to me, which means 
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that I can evaluate whether their interpretation makes sense. Still, my interpretations are 
vulnerable to framing effects from their analysis.  
Another issue is related to what the committee has included and left out of their report. What 
are the reasons behind their choices? Based on the report and the material I have read, I find 
strong indications of lack of listening and narrow-minded thinking and decision-making at both 
Boeing and the FAA. But I do not know what I might be missing. There could be a lot of other 
internal communication that could give a different picture than this report and the documents 
they have chosen to publicly release.  
An ethical issue I have considered is related to the persons that are named in the committee 
report. Even though this is a public report, and that the persons that are named have been 
mentioned in much more public arenas than this master thesis, it would be regrettable if I were 
to convey information that is incorrect or misleading. However, based on the report, the 
documents that have been released, and other sources, I consider this risk to be low. 
I still want to stress that the publicly released documents have been interpreted by the 
committee. My interpretation is based both on reading some of the source material directly and 
on the committee’s interpretation. There are also other interpretations that can be made of the 
material that could be more or less valid. In fact, what really happened will never be totally 
known. Different persons looking at the case will focus on different things dependent on who 
they are. I therefore encourage the reader to make up their own opinion. In chapter 6.4, I also 
discuss alternative explanations and narratives to mitigate the tendency to obsess over the 
intentions and actions of individuals. 
Lastly, the content analysis of the annual reports has limited value on its own. I added the 
content analysis as a small supplement to the case discussion based on a finding from the 
thematic analysis. For example, what if Boeing at some stage decided to replace “$” with 
“dollars”? This would reduce the frequency of “$”, but this would of course not matter if it was 
replaced with a synonym and the total frequency of the concept was the same. Similarly, what 
if Boeing hired a new communication department, and that the frequency of “safe” simply is 
due to a new communication strategy based on the preferences of the department, and not 
because safety has become a more salient issue for managers at Boeing?  
However, since I use the content analysis as a supplement to other observations, I think the 
findings do have value. Regardless of the cause, a shift in public communication focus has 
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happened. This pattern is apparent by reading through the annual reports and other publicly 
available material at Boeing, such as quarterly reports and proxies to shareholders. Whether 
this means that safety has become a more salient issue in the managers’ day to day operations, 
remains an open question. 
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Chapter 3: Narrative literature review 
3.1 Our subjective world 
3.1.1 Bounded rationality 
Neoclassical economics has traditionally considered the human decision-making process to be 
rational. This implies that we as decision-makers know our preferences, can apply our 
knowledge consistently, can deal with stress and uncertainty, can make accurate assessments, 
and are able to calculate and choose options with the highest expected utility (Simon, 2000). In 
reality, our human brain does not have the unlimited computational power those abilities 
require. Instead, it has limitations that make decision-making processes messy. Since the 1950s, 
when Herbert Simon published his work on bounded rationality, several scholars have 
illustrated how we fail to make optimal decisions in the way the rational model prescribes 
(Bazerman & Moore, 2017). Even though we attempt to make rational decisions, we are 
unsuccessful in predictable ways due to both internal and external factors, such as perceptual 
errors, lack of information, and influences from our environment. 
Our knowledge of ourselves, others, and the world is enclosed in mental knowledge structures 
called schemas that help us interpret our surroundings (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). These 
knowledge structures enable us to form impressions rapidly based on our previous experiences 
(Aronson et al., 2013). While schemas help us navigate the world effortlessly, they can also 
cause suboptimal thinking. They often lead us to interpret ambiguous information in accordance 
with our expectations and fill in missing information with our own assumptions (Baldwin, 
1992). Furthermore, random factors, such as priming and how accessible the schema is in our 
memory, can affect which schema is retrieved and applied in a situation. 
In addition, our thought processes lead us to make faulty judgments, which is a main source of 
our inability to make rational decisions. The dominant view of how thoughts arise is the dual 
process theory, which postulates that humans have two distinct cognitive processes for thinking 
(Kahneman, 2003). The first, system 1, is fast, intuitive, and emotional. System 1 allows us to 
interpret our surroundings automatically without conscious thought (Aronson et al., 2013), and 
is the basis for most of our decisions. System 2, on the other hand, is slow, deliberate, and 
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effortful (Kahneman, 2003). It is system 1, due to how it generates highly accessible 
impressions, that controls our judgments unless we actively override it with system 2. System 
2 allows us to engage in deliberate reasoning, monitor our intuitive system 1 responses, and 
correct for errors if detected. It enables us to think things through and should preferably be used 
for important decisions (Bazerman & Moore, 2017). It has, however, limited capacity and is 
also easily disrupted, especially if we are subject to stress or time constraints.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have shown that we use heuristics, mental shortcuts, to make 
inferences about our surroundings when we rely on our intuitive system 1 thinking. These 
heuristics determine the impressions we get and the judgements we make. Even though 
heuristics are useful since they help us handle complexity efficiently, they make us vulnerable 
to systematic biases that influence our judgment and lead us to wrong conclusions (Bazerman 
& Moore, 2017). We use several types of heuristics when we make judgments, which in turn 
can induce numerous biases. I will now briefly mention four heuristics and what Bazerman 
considers to be the mother of all biases to establish some ground for the rest of this thesis.  
First, we have an availability heuristic, which is our tendency to assess situations based on what 
is most easily retrieved from memory (Bazerman & Moore, 2017). Second, we have a 
representativeness heuristic, which is our tendency to put people or things into categories that 
we compare. Third, we have a confirmation heuristic, which is our tendency to selectively 
choose which data we will use when we test hypotheses. Fourth, we have an affect heuristic, 
which is our tendency to base our decisions on our immediate emotional responses instead of 
higher-level reasoning. While these heuristics help us make quick, and often effective 
judgments, we are usually unaware of how they influence our thought processes (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Consequently, we fail to question our judgments and correct for the 
predictable errors they tend to create (Bazerman & Moore, 2017). Hence, we are affected by an 
overconfidence bias. We trust our judgments and believe they are correct, even though there 
exists evidence that we should be questioning ourselves. 
Felin et al. (2017) provide a different look at bounded rationality that I think is relevant to the 
later sections in this thesis on mental models and listening. They claim that the literature on 
bounded rationality relies on a troublesome assumption of an objective, all-seeing eye that 
knows what the rational choice in any given situation is. They suggest that instead of 
considering deviations from this as biased, we should consider them as indications of how we 
direct our perception and awareness. This means there is no objective, optimal solution waiting 
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to be correctly perceived. Instead, reality has several expressions and representations, 
depending on the perceiver. The perceiver imposes their expectations, assumptions, and 
theories on their surroundings. Hence, different individuals see different realities because they 
have unique life experiences and focus on different things. Therefore, we can interpret a 
situation in numerous ways and there is not necessarily one correct interpretation that is 
objectively optimal (Felin et al., 2017). 
3.1.2 Self-concept 
As humans, we have thoughts and feelings about what it means to be ourselves, a self-concept, 
which can be looked at as our own ideology about who we are in the world (Gecas, 1982). It 
includes aspects such as our various social identities and personal attributes that eventually have 
emerged as “us” throughout our interaction with the world and others. Our self-identity 
determines how we express ourselves in relation to others in different types of social roles 
(Caldwell, 2009). In addition, we have a moral identity, which includes our answers to questions 
regarding right and wrong, what personal qualities one ought to pursue, and who and what we 
feel responsible for.  
There are three important motives linked with self-concept that drive our behavior (Gecas, 
1982). The first motive is self-efficacy, which is connected to our sense of being an active agent 
in our lives. We find ways to increase our competence, power, and we continuously search for 
purpose and direction. If we lose our sense of control and no longer perceive that we have any 
influence on our environment, this can create feelings of alienation and reduced well-being 
(Gecas, 1982). 
Secondly, we have a self-esteem motive, which means that we feel a need to maintain and 
enhance a positive image of ourselves (Gecas, 1982). If we encounter information that threatens 
our self-concept, this motive can make us distort reality in self-serving ways. It could, for 
example, cause us to selectively process the threatening information by neglecting parts of it 
and by framing the rest in ways that are beneficial for ourselves. It could drive us to search for 
information that puts us in a positive light, while ignoring information that could lead us to a 
more negative conclusion.  
The third motive is the need for consistency (Gecas, 1982). We have rigid knowledge structures, 
self-schemas, of ourselves, that we tend to maintain in order to feel a sense of continuity of who 
20 
 
we are. We feel committed to different types of roles, their associated behaviors and values. 
When we experience a lack of congruence between whom we think we should be and how we 
are behaving, this leads to cognitive dissonance, a feeling of discomfort, that motivates us to 
either change our behavior or to find ways to rationalize it (Gecas, 1982; Caldwell, 2009). 
3.1.3 Self-deception 
Self-deception means being unaware of how we come to believe what we do, and includes 
practices like avoiding the truth and justifying our self-interested behaviors (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004). It could lead us to claim that we know more than we do, engage in wishful 
thinking, and be unwilling to examine evidence that contradicts what we want to believe or that 
could be a source of discomforting feelings (Caldwell, 2009). Furthermore, we often project 
our own problems onto others and deny problems that are apparent to outsiders. We also tend 
to blame others and avoid acknowledging our own contribution to what has happened.  
All these self-serving mechanisms are types of self-defenses we engage in to protect our egos 
(Caldwell, 2009). While these self-defenses help us avoid pain, handle stress, and preserve our 
sense of self-worth, they also have adverse consequences for our perception of the world around 
us. If we deny ourselves access to the truth and are insensitive to feedback from our 
environment, it gets more difficult to grow as persons and create healthy relationships with 
others. When we distort reality to serve our own interests and are unable to see the nuances of 
situations, we often end up treating others as objects instead of persons with unique value. As 
a result, trust deteriorates, and we deprive ourselves and others of realizing the fullest potential 
of our relationship (Caldwell, 2009).  
3.1.4 Self-awareness 
Since self-deceiving distortion and filtering of reality usually happens unconsciously, 
awareness of our own self-deceiving tendencies is necessary if we want to understand ourselves 
and others more accurately (Caldwell, 2009). Self-awareness involves the ability to be receptive 
to cues from our environment about how others perceive us, knowing our strengths and 
weaknesses, and understanding our emotions. It involves being able to monitor and reflect on 
our behavior, and taking active behavioral choices based on these assessments in order to live 
life more congruently and in adherence to our ethical obligations (Caldwell, 2009). Self-
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awareness is also considered to be a cornerstone of emotional intelligence and our ability to be 
empathetic towards others (Caldwell & Hayes, 2016). Emotional intelligence and self-
awareness enable us to become sensitive to the needs of others in different contexts and 
communicate in ways that effectively strengthen our relationships. 
3.1.5 Attitudes and beliefs 
Self-deception stems from our beliefs, attitudes, and intentions (Caldwell, 2009). Many factors, 
such as personal experiences, age, ethnicity, values, education, and upbringing, influence our 
beliefs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Some of our beliefs are explicit, which means we can 
articulate and reflect on them, while others are implicit, which means they are unconscious and 
involuntarily activated (Aronson et al., 2013). Our beliefs influence our attitudes, which are our 
evaluations of other individuals, ideas, and objects. Our attitudes can also shape our beliefs, for 
example through distorted processing of information.  
Some of our attitudes are strong, rigid, and resistant to change (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). The 
stronger the attitude is, the more accessible it is in our memory as a learned association. This 
increases the likelihood that it will be automatically activated and that it will define how we 
perceive new situations. This makes it more likely that we engage in a behavior or judgment 
that is consistent with that attitude. Thus, when such an attitude is activated, it can bias our 
thinking (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005).  
If we have the capacity and motivation to engage in deliberate thought, we can construct our 
attitude and attempt to correct for biases (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). But if we lack self-
awareness and are blind to our own beliefs and attitudes, random factors and experiences from 
our past can heavily influence our thinking without us even realizing it. This is especially 
troublesome when our attitudes lead to maladaptive behaviors.  
3.1.6 Mental models 
Our attitudes, beliefs, self-concept, self-deception tendencies, and cognitive limitations all 
impact how we perceive our surroundings and behave. This is highly relevant to our ability to 
listen and make ethical decisions, which are the next main sections of this literature review. To 
get a grip on what the point of departure of listening interactions are, I will now discuss the 
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concept of mental models. This concept has slightly different meanings depending on the 
context. In essence, they all relate to how we make sense of the world around us, but they 
sometimes differ in scope. I will discuss this concept mainly from two perspectives. First, as 
the way we holistically make sense of the world. Secondly, as a type of toolbox, which we can 
use to frame situations differently. 
To begin with, I want to mention that mental models relate to schemas. While schemas are 
inflexible knowledge structures that help us make fast associations, mental models can be 
considered a combination of several schemas that are used dynamically to make sense of the 
world and predict what will happen (Jones et al., 2011; Chermack, 2003). There is data 
everywhere, but as humans, we do not have the mental capacity to process everything in our 
complex surroundings (Besnard et al., 2004). Instead, we handle data selectively and build 
simplified internal representations of the world, mental models, that become the basis for our 
reasoning and decision-making processes (Jones et al., 2011).  
Werhane et al. (2013) consider this to be based on social constructivism, which postulates that 
our mind actively constructs and projects meaning to our surroundings instead of passively 
taking in the external world. When we experience something, we interact with the incoming, 
complex stream of data through selective filtering and framing (Werhane et al., 2011). Our life 
experiences, attitudes, beliefs, biases, and goals influence what we pay attention to and how we 
filter information (Chermack, 2003). Thus, we create meaning of new situations through our 
unique lens of preexisting assumptions and beliefs. This means that all of us to some extent 
have a different understanding of the external world. 
Since our way of filtering information is unique, and because when we filter something is 
always left out, our internal representation of reality is always incomplete (Besnard et al., 2004). 
This means that we have blind spots. However, as previously discussed, we tend to be 
overconfident and believe that our understanding of the world is correct. This is especially true 
when events around us meet our expectations, which can be considered data we use to support 
our own hypotheses about our surroundings. Our intuitive, system 1, reasoning is particularly 
vulnerable to this, and often causes us to make wrong inferences. Our deliberate system 2 can, 
in contrast, look for counterfactual data and overcome our faulty intuitive judgments (Johnson-
Laird & Ragni, 2019).  
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Mental models can also be looked upon as tools that we apply to understand something. By 
knowing a lot of ideas from a diverse set of disciplines of knowledge, we can see the world 
through several frames (Parrish & Beaubien, 2019). For example, the disciplines of physics, 
chemistry, biology, economics, and psychology all have some big main ideas and models of 
looking at the world. By knowing the basics of these ideas, we do not have to restrict ourselves 
to utilizing them only within that narrow context. Instead, we can apply the principles these 
ideas teach us to make sense of other situations. This enables us to tap into a toolbox of models 
that we can apply to see a problem from a diverse set of angles. It allows us to deframe ourselves 
from the usual lenses through which we see things, detach ourselves from their limitations, and 




3.2 When two subjective worlds meet 
3.2.1 What is listening? 
We hear sounds all the time. It is a passive, involuntary process that does not require much 
effort (MacLeod, 2016). Listening, on the other hand, is an active process that requires cognitive 
effort. When we listen, we attempt to understand and interpret the whole message that someone 
is trying to communicate, and not just passively receive the words. This includes being attentive 
to cues such as body language, tone of voice, and being able to recall the essence of what the 
other person said. Good listening requires concentration and the ability to focus. If our mind 
wanders, the sounds the other person makes may be perceived by us, but effective listening has 
not taken place (MacLeod, 2016).  
3.2.2 Ineffective listening 
Listening can be of different effectiveness. As mentioned, we see the world through mental 
models that are colored by our experiences, attitudes, and beliefs. In addition, we are vulnerable 
to self-deception, self-serving tendencies, and flawed judgment. We bring this with us into 
conversations. Consequently, if we are not aware of how our own biases and assumptions color 
our view of the world, there is a high probability that our ability to listen will suffer. It could 
cause us to engage in negative listening behaviors that hurt communication, such as ignoring 
information that does not fit with our preexisting schemas; pretending to listen while waiting 
for our turn to speak; becoming defensive; believing that we already know what the other person 
will convey; interrupting, and not paying attention to the whole message of emotions and 
meanings being communicated (MacLeod, 2016). 
One of the most renowned scholars on listening was the American psychologist Carl Rogers.  
Rogers considered one of the biggest roadblocks to effective communication to be listening 
with judgment (Rogers & Roethlisberger, 1952/1991). This happens when the listener is 
judging and evaluating the statements of the other person, which is an inclination we all have. 
It is an unconscious, automatic process. Instead of understanding how others experience the 
world from their perspective, we tend to evaluate their statements from our point of view. When 
we listen in this manner, we focus on our own feelings and thoughts about what the other person 
is saying. Rogers calls this listening about instead of listening with. We try to figure out whether 
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we agree with the other person, whether we approve of what they have to say, and judge them 
based on how they fit into our understanding of reality. This way of listening can lead us to talk 
past each other. We engage in a dance of evaluation, but do not obtain an understanding of how 
others see things. Their thoughts and emotions go unheard, even though we are right there with 
them. Thus, no meaningful communication occurs between us (Rogers, 1961/2012). 
3.2.3 Empathetic listening 
There is, however, another type of listening that is on the other side of the quality spectrum. 
This is listening with understanding, also known as active listening and empathetic listening, a 
concept thoroughly explored by Rogers. This is a listening construct with three components: 
comprehension, attentiveness, and relational aspects (Itzchakov & Kluger, 2017).  
An empathetic listener attempts to see the world through the eyes of the other person, exploring 
what the expressed ideas and attitudes look like from the other person’s internal frame of 
reference (Rogers & Roethlisberger, 1952/1991). This means that the listener attempts to 
accurately sense the emotions and meanings as the other person senses them, as if the listener 
were the other person (Rogers, 1959). It means fully attending to the other person. As the 
conversation develops, the listener regularly expresses their understanding of what the other 
person is communicating. By doing this, the listener can be corrected and gain a more precise 
comprehension of the other’s subjective world. This also makes it clear to the person being 
listened to that there is someone on the receiving end who is attempting to understand them.  
Listening empathetically goes beyond words, since words rarely capture the full extent of our 
experience. There are emotions behind the words that may or may not be apparent through our 
tone of voice, choice of words or body language. If one person enters the conversation thinking 
that communication is a logical and rational process, in which an understanding of the words 
the other person is conveying is enough to understand what they are expressing, the 
communication will be ineffective, since much of the meaning will go undetected (Rogers & 
Roethlisberger, 1952/1991).  
Empathetic listening also includes features that impact the listening effectiveness and influence 
whether the relationship will improve or deteriorate (Rogers, 1959). The first feature is positive 
regard, which is entering the relationship with an attitude of warmth, acceptance, and respect 
for the other person. For a relationship to improve, there must be at least some positive regard 
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present that is felt by the other person. Ideally, the positive regard should be unconditional. This 
means that we always meet others with an attitude of acceptance, and not just when they 
conform to our expectations.  
A second feature is suspension of judgment. Judgment or evaluation can be perceived as a threat 
by the other person, which could increase defensiveness (Rogers, 1961/2012). In a state of 
defensiveness, we attempt to maintain our current self-concept (Rogers, 1959). Instead of 
accepting an experience fully as it is, we either distort it to make it fit with our concept of self 
or deny it entry to our awareness. In a state of openness, we do the opposite. Instead of distorting 
experiences to make them fit with our self-concept, we revise our concept of self to include 
these experiences. Instead of shielding ourselves from certain thoughts and emotions that we 
may think are wrong or should not be there, we embrace them. We let these emotions and 
thoughts enter our awareness fully as they are. We do not feel any need to change them, even 
though they might be disturbing or even contradictory. By doing this, there is a state of 
congruence between the self and the experience, which according to Rogers is a key to being a 
fully functioning and psychologically well-adjusted individual. Thus, when we suspend our 
judgment in a relationship, we create a condition that allows others to be more open. The other 
person is not pressured to conform to an external standard, but can instead be their own judge 
of what a valid expression of themselves looks like (Rogers, 1961/2012). 
The third feature is the degree of congruence of the listener. While it is crucial that the person 
being listened to feels they can be themselves fully without having to hide behind a façade, it 
also matters that the listener is genuine (Rogers, 1961/2012, 1959). To be congruent requires a 
high degree of self-awareness. The listener must be able to listen closely to their own inner 
experiences. If the listener can be open to their own feelings and attitudes during the 
conversation, accepting the feelings’ presence in awareness instead of distorting or diminishing 
them, and even communicating them to the other person when it feels right to do so, the listener 
has a high degree of congruence. A congruent listener does not play a role. Instead, they are 
themselves in the relationship. There is a match between their inner experiences and what they 
express through words and body language. This increases the genuineness of the whole 
relationship, increasing mutual trust. If the listener, on the other hand, is not sufficiently self-
aware, for example by suppressing negative feelings, these feelings still might express 
themselves in small ways. In such a case, the listener sends mixed signals to the other person, 
which reduces trust. 
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Another characteristic of empathetic listening is that the listener is willing to be changed 
(Rogers & Roethlisberger, 1952/1991). When we are temporarily able to reduce our tendency 
of judgment and defensiveness, and instead focus on experiencing the world as someone else 
is experiencing it, embracing reality from their point of view, there is a chance that this 
understanding will affect us. We could get influenced, our views could change, and there is a 
chance we learn something new. Rogers says this is a risk that many lack the courage to 
undertake. This is also in stark contrast to entering the conversation predetermined that our way 
of seeing things is the right way. However, since everything we perceive is filtered through our 
preexisting schemas, it is not possible to listen entirely without bias (Bodie, 2010). 
Nevertheless, if we are sufficiently aware of our own tendencies to selectively interpret 
information, we can monitor ourselves, and, to the best of our abilities, attempt to temporarily 
enter the subjective world of the other person and try to view it as they do.  
3.2.4 Effects of empathetic listening 
Listening with empathetic understanding has important benefits. The first benefit is related to 
the feeling of connectedness (Rogers, 1980/1995). When someone feels that another person is 
able to grasp their inner experience in an accurate way, they feel less alienated and more 
connected to other human beings. Having their experience validated reduces the feeling of 
estrangement. On the other hand, if somebody experiences that nobody understands them 
correctly, this could lead to feelings of isolation and abnormality, thus weakening the feeling 
of relatedness to others. A study by Morelli et al. (2014) supports the claim of human 
connectedness. They show that feeling understood activates areas of the brain associated with 
reward and social connection, while not feeling understood leads to feelings of negative affect.   
A second benefit is that the person being listened to feels accepted, valued, and cared for 
(Rogers, 1980/1995). Listening empathetically is a sign of respect and interest in the other 
person, an acknowledgment of their worth (Rogers & Farson, 1957/2015). When someone is 
listened to in this way, they become more open and less self-critical of inner experiences. It 
becomes easier for the individual to allow for a more diverse set of thoughts and feelings to 
flow through awareness. Thoughts and emotions that previously were considered by the 
individual to be too scary to acknowledge internally or to experience fully, may to a larger 
degree be embraced and accepted as a part of being human. When someone can be vulnerable 
in this way, without the fear of being ridiculed, rejected, or judged, but rather experience 
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someone who accepts them for the person they are, a condition for growth and integration is 
created. According to Fonagy and Allison (2014) having one’s subjectivity understood could 
lead to less rigidity and open for perceiving the world and oneself differently. When someone 
expresses their understanding of what we are saying, we get a better understanding of what we 
are saying ourselves. We get to clarify and dwell deeper into our own experiences. A study by 
Itzchakov et al. (2020) support this claim. They found that high quality listening enables the 
speaker to reflect on their experience. This can enhance the speaker’s self-insight and reduce 
their prejudice.  
Another benefit is that someone who feels understood becomes less defensive (Rogers & 
Roethlisberger, 1952/1991). Feeling heard leads to a reduction in black-white thinking, 
exaggerated statements, and to more constructive and nuanced conversations. Poor listening, 
on the other hand, leads to increased defensiveness (Itzchakov et al., 2020). It also undermines 
the reflection opportunities that increased self-insight requires. Rogers also suggests that feeling 
heard leads to more positive attitudes towards the conversational partner, a claim that a study 
by Bruneau and Saxe (2012) supports. This study was, however, made in a quite different 
context. They studied perspective-taking and perspective-giving in the context of intergroup 
conflict and asymmetrical power relationships. They found that being heard, meaning that the 
perspective-giver (the person who spoke) felt that the conversational partner had 
nonjudgmentally, empathically, and accurately paraphrased the perspective they 
communicated, led to more positive attitudes towards their conversational partner.  
On an organizational level, another positive effect of listening with understanding is that it leads 
to a conversation that is more connected to the objective truth (Rogers & Roethlisberger, 
1952/1991). When we are able to reduce judgment and are aware of the colored lens through 
which we are looking at the world, we can stop acting on our own assumptions. Instead of 
immediately voicing our own opinions based on our first perceptions of what someone else is 
saying, we can instead ask for clarification to gain a clearer understanding of their point of 
view. By doing this, we can engage in dialogue, instead of debate (Schein, 1993), which allows 
us to build mutual understanding. Rather than trying to convince others that we are right, we 
can explore the subtleties of each other’s thinking, which enables us to get a fuller picture. This 
has positive implications for the decision-making process. It enables group members to explore 
each other’s thinking and clarify misconceptions. This creates a better collective understanding 
of what the decision means. The probability of interpreting the decision differently has been 
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reduced. This is also positive for the follow-up and implementation of the decision, as the group 
has a mutual understanding of where they are headed (Schein, 1993). 
Furthermore, if we ought to make decisions that incorporate other people’s concerns and 
interests, one of the best sources for acquiring this understanding, is most likely through 
conversations with the affected stakeholders themselves. Research from negotiation indicates 
that listening is a key for obtaining a better understanding of others’ interests (Itzchakov & 
Kluger, 2017), which is important for identifying possibilities for integrative, win-win solutions 
(Rognes, 2015). It is also important for our general ability to handle situations where 
stakeholders have opposing interests, as miscommunication based on a false understanding of 
others’ intent, could lead to escalation of conflicts (Wall & Callister, 1995).  
3.2.5 Psychological safety 
According to Rogers (1961/2012) empathetic listening creates a climate of psychological 
safety. In this climate, individuals can feel free to explore what it means to be themselves 
without fear. Experiences are accepted as they are into awareness, instead of being suppressed 
or distorted by defensive mechanisms. Ideas can be played with and rigidity is reduced. Rogers 
thinks of this as a climate in which individuals can grow as persons and be creative, a climate 
in which the potential of the individual can be released and actualized. The individual does no 
longer feel threatened or forced to conform to the expectations of others. The individual’s sense 
of worth and value is grounded in themselves rather than in the evaluation and praise of others. 
Rogers’ understanding of psychological safety has a close resemblance to how scholars 
understand it today. Psychological safety is often defined in terms of how safe an individual 
perceives it to be to take interpersonal risks (Edmondson & Lei, 2014). Certain behaviors have 
uncertain outcomes, and how an individual thinks that others will respond will affect whether 
they engage in this behavior (Edmondson, 1999). Psychological safety is dependent on several 
factors, among others, whether individuals feel they can be themselves without being rejected, 
share their opinions without negative consequences, and whether they perceive they are 
participating in a climate of mutual respect in which people have positive intentions towards 
one another (Newman et al., 2017).  
When someone takes an interpersonal risk, for example by voicing a controversial or unfiltered 
opinion, how others respond will affect the feeling of psychological safety. If the person is met 
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with disapproval, is ridiculed or rejected, this could cause feelings of loss of face, inferiority, 
or embarrassment, which could lead to self-censorship, disengagement, and self-protecting 
behaviors (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006; Edmondson & Lei, 2014). Leadership style also 
impacts psychological safety. Leaders who behave in a supportive, democratic manner and who 
are open to critique, impact psychological safety more positively than unsupportive, 
authoritarian, and defensive leaders. Similarly, leaders who include team members in 
discussions, acknowledge and appreciate their contribution, positively affect psychological 
safety (Bradley et al., 2012). 
There are several beneficial effects of psychological safety. When people feel psychologically 
safe, they are more likely to communicate openly, share information and knowledge, give 
feedback, disclose mistakes, and request help from others (Edmondson & Lei, 2014). They are 
more willing to be vulnerable, share thoughts, and speak up. These behaviors have positive 
implications for creativity and innovation, identifying risks and opportunities, and 
organizational learning. In addition, psychological safety is linked to larger organizational 
commitment, more positive attitudes towards teamwork, and more successful implementation 
of new initiatives (Newman et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, a mutual feeling of psychological safety enables people to engage in constructive 
task conflicts (Bradley et al., 2012). When team members feel that others have positive regard 
for them, the tendency to interpret the contributions of others as personal attacks reduces. Team 
members can challenge each other without having to artificially soften their opinions to 
preserve a sense of group harmony. Hence, it becomes easier to actively engage in discussions 
and disagreements in a constructive way, which is positive for the team’s effectiveness.  
3.2.6 Self-determination theory 
Another perspective that can shed light on why the responses of others matter in interpersonal 
relationships is self-determination theory, which addresses what types of motivation individuals 
feel when undertaking certain behaviors. Self-determination theory distinguishes between 
different types of motivations on a continuum from controlled to autonomous (Gagné & Deci, 
2005). Controlled types of motivation are dependent on factors such as rewards, punishment, 
and contingent self-worth. Autonomous types of motivation, on the other hand, are based on 
how the individual perceives that the behavior is related to their goals, values, and interests. 
31 
When individuals are autonomously motivated, they are self-determined, and feel in control of 
their actions (Deci et al., 1989). This can lead to a higher degree of job satisfaction because the 
individual feels that the work is self-initiated and personally relevant (Gagné & Deci, 2005). 
Self-determination theory postulates that human beings have three basic psychological needs 
that impact psychological functioning, well-being, and development (Deci & Ryan, 2008). 
These are the needs for autonomy, which is related to feeling in control of one’s actions, 
relatedness, which is feeling social belonging, and competence, which is related to the feeling 
of mastery (Van Quaquebeke & Felps, 2018). The satisfaction of these needs impacts whether 
the individual will feel an autonomous or controlled type of motivation. 
In addition, the fulfillment of these three basic needs is important for the functioning of 
interpersonal relationships (La Guardia & Patrick, 2008). When others reach out to us, we can 
support their needs by responding to them sensitively with positive regard, encouraging them 
to explore their experiences, and helping them face their challenges. Furthermore, if people 
have autonomous motives for attending to their relationships, they tend to show more positive 
interaction behaviors compared to people who have a more controlled motivation. Their 
behaviors are open and flexible, instead of avoidant and defensive.  
Our behavior can support or thwart others’ need for autonomy, relatedness, and competence 
(Ryan & Deci, 2008). Since the experience of self-determination positively affects aspects such 
as learning, self-esteem, creativity, and feelings of worth (Deci et al., 1989), how we behave is 
important to consider if we ought to treat people with dignity. Van Quaquebeke and Felps 
(2018) suggest that leaders could engage in respectful inquiry, which they define as asking open 
questions followed by listening attentively to the answer. When leaders ask open questions, 
they invite the other person to express themselves and reveal what they think. When leaders 
listen attentively to the answer that is given, they show interest and care. Respectful inquiry 
also signals to the other person that they are competent, belong, and have control. However, 
this must be genuine. If the leader asks questions without listening well, the leader sends 




3.2.7 Employee voice 
Listening is also related to the concept of employee voice, which is about employees’ 
opportunities to speak up and share their ideas and perspectives in an organization, both to 
managers and their coworkers (Nechanska et al., 2020). Having employees who speak up is 
important for several reasons, such as knowledge sharing, exploring new opportunities, 
improving services and products, as well as identifying problems and threats. When employees 
are willing to speak up, managers can tap into a more diverse set of knowledge that can be used 
to improve their decision-making. If employees, on the other hand, stay silent, important 
information could remain unshared, hurting the organization’s interests. Hence, employee voice 
has important implications for organizational performance (Nechasnka et al., 2020; Sherf et al., 
2019). 
Several factors can influence employee voice, such as organizational structure, culture, and 
availability of formal and informal voice mechanisms (Nechanska et al., 2020). Two important 
issues are related to psychological safety and voice efficacy. Employee voice is negatively 
affected when employees feel that interpersonal risk-taking is unsafe or think that speaking up 
will lead to negative career consequences. The likelihood of speaking up is similarly reduced if 
employees do not expect that their input will be listened to.  
The way managers act has important implications for employee voice. When managers actively 
encourage and ask for employees’ input, they signal to the employee that their thoughts matter 
(Sherf et al., 2019). This motivates employees to speak up. However, many managers do not 
encourage employees to speak up or show any openness to receive input. One explanation is 
that managers differ in their long-term orientation and sense of control. While employee voice 
can lead to increased long-term performance, it can have short-term costs in terms of friction 
and disagreements. If the manager is not long-term oriented, voice-seeking behaviors are less 
likely. Managers also differ in their sense of control over their environment. Some managers 
just relay information from top-management, and do not really have sufficient power to elicit 
meaningful change. This can lead to a reluctance to seek out input from others (Sherf et al., 
2019). 
A second explanation is that managers can feel threatened by employee voice, and thus do not 
seek it in order to protect their egos from criticism (Sherf et al., 2019). Managers can correctly 
or incorrectly interpret input from employees as a signal of their own shortcomings (Fast et al., 
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2014). This can threaten the manager’s feeling of self-worth and competence, and lead to self-
defensive behaviors. Studies have also shown that people in general do not tend to take advice 
from others, especially if the other person is in a position of less power and the feedback has 
not been asked for. 
A third, slightly more pessimistic, explanation, is that some leaders are narcissists that, through 
self-deceiving and self-defensive mechanisms, feel they are entitled to impose their enlightened 
view of the world upon their organization (Caldwell & Canuto-Carranco, 2010). They use 
others as means to reach their self-serving goals, and kill morale, trust, and employee initiative 
in the process. 
Unfavorable conditions for employee voice can lead to employees who intentionally or 
unintentionally remain silent (Nechanska et al., 2020). Some employees might withhold 
information to get back at their employer. Others might be compliant to get by, but end up 
withdrawing emotionally and stop actively participating and sharing their thoughts. If 
employees feel the psychological contract with their organization has been broken, they could 
start feeling cynical toward it, adopting an attitude that their organization lacks integrity, and 
acts in an unfair, untruthful, and insincere way (Abraham, 2000). This could lead to negative 
consequences, such as a decrease in cooperative behaviors, and cause feelings of dissatisfaction, 
such as frustration, alienation, and contempt. It can also deteriorate trust and ruin the 
relationship between employee and employer, which can hurt organizational effectiveness 
(Naus et al., 2007). If employees perceive the environment as toxic or that their contribution is 
not appreciated, and if they feel that they are not treated with dignity and respect, this could 
eventually lead to their resignation (Caldwell & Canuto-Carranco, 2010). This could cause the 




3.3 Making ethical decisions 
3.3.1 The need for ethical leadership 
Friedman (1970/2007) famously stated that the only objective of business is to maximize profits 
and to serve the interests of shareholders, as long as the agreed upon rules of society are 
followed. While this theoretically, from a neoclassical economics free market perspective, leads 
to the most efficient outcome, reality differs from the economic models business schools teach. 
In real life, corporations are not limited to playing competitive games within laws that have 
been mutually agreed upon to protect the common good. Instead, corporations actively shape 
laws to fit their own agendas through lobbyism and revolving doors (Ramanna, 2020), inflicting 
negative externalities and public bads on society (McGahan, 2020).  
Some of the biggest economies in the world are now powerful corporations (Belinchón & 
Moynihan, 2018). They span across international borders, complicating regulations that are 
already thwarted by self-interested politicians. Fortunately, many organizations have adapted 
business practices that to a larger degree attend to the interests of multiple stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, managers are still expected to deliver economic results to shareholders. 
Companies often incentivize managers, deliberately or accidentally, to pursue short-term 
economic performance, which increases the probability of irresponsible business practices (Ims 
et al., 2014). While corporate governance is supposed to protect shareholders’ long-term 
interests, most shareholders do not have long-term interests in the companies they own, with an 
average share holding time of about eight months (Fiske, 2016). For those who remain, 
corporate governance is often ineffective, with several instances of incompetent boards and 
directors that function as puppets of the CEO (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). Relying on markets 
or incentives alone is therefore insufficient for responsible business behavior. 
Bazerman and Moore (2017) suggest that many corporate scandals are not best explained by 
leaders who consciously choose to behave unethically in self-serving ways. Instead, they offer 
a view based on bounded ethicality, which suggests that we sometimes behave contrary to our 
values, but do not realize it due to system 1 thinking. When we consciously think ahead of time 
of ethical dilemmas, we tend to have a clear sense that we should and will act ethically 
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). But if the situation arises, there is a risk we will not behave 
as we predicted. This is because problems that arise in real time rarely are framed in ethical 
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terms, but instead in business or legal terms. The ethical dimension tends to fade away, which 
can lead us to ignore the ethical ramifications of our actions. Furthermore, many unethical 
scandals cannot merely be explained by the actions of one individual alone, but rather as a 
collective failure where bystanders indirectly support behavior they would otherwise condemn 
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). Regardless of the reasons for such scandals, it is clear that 
organizations need decision-makers who are able to demonstrate care and respect for multiple 
stakeholders over a long time horizon. 
However, decision-makers often face difficult tradeoffs between self-interest and concern for 
others (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), and pressure for high financial performance could cause 
leaders to sacrifice human and ecological interests (Hicks & Waddock, 2016). Waddock (2019) 
argues that leaders should put themselves in the shoes of their stakeholders, listen to them, learn 
from them, and understand their point of view before decisions are made. By realizing that the 
world is connected and by measuring success in other ways than short-term financial 
performance, businesses can contribute to sustainability and overall goodness. Through long-
term, holistic thinking, leaders can take responsibility for how their actions affect others.  
De Colle et al. (2017) emphasize the responsibility that leaders have for their employees. They 
argue that leaders must treat employees with dignity, recognize their full complexity as humans, 
and not just use them as economic resources as means to an end. Treating someone with dignity 
involves acts such as acknowledging them, accepting them, creating safety, understanding 
them, treating them fairly, validating them, valuing their contribution, and helping them to live 
good lives. One way of enabling dignity is to enable employees to be the persons they are in 
the roles they fill, giving them freedom to fill their roles with their own humanity and creativity. 
This can open for authenticity, trust, and for people to bring passion into reaching shared 
organizational goals (de Colle et al., 2017). 
3.3.2 Decision-making 
Organizational decision-making can be looked upon as a process consisting of four stages 
(March & Olsen, 1976). First, an individual perceives a discrepancy between their own mental 
representations of the world and how the world actually is. This discrepancy drives the 
individual’s behavior in choice situations, which is aggregated into organizational actions based 
on a shared sense of this discrepancy across the organization. Lastly, the environment responds 
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to the actions of the organization, which will give individuals in the organization new data they 
can use to reassess their own mental representations. This four-staged cycle of choice can thus 
also be considered a cycle of learning. 
 
Figure 1: The cycle of choice (from March & Olsen, 1976) 
The model of choice has some assumptions (March & Olsen, 1976). It assumes that the mental 
representations of individuals will drive their behavior, that individual behavior will lead to 
organizational action, that organizational action will lead to responses from the environment, 
and that responses from the environment will affect the mental models of individuals in 
organizations. 
In real life, each of these assumptions could break down (March & Olsen, 1976). This is because 
organizational decision-making is full of ambiguity and complexity. Organizations do not 
always have clear objectives or a correct understanding of their environment, and the arenas of 
decision-making frequently become arenas of power struggle, politics, and group socialization. 
Organizational members do not necessarily learn and adapt from the feedback they receive from 
their environment. Random factors could affect each stage of the choice process, and there often 
lacks a clear link between the outcome and the decision that was made.  
3.3.3 Considering multiple stakeholders and dimensions 
The mental models of decision-makers affect how they act in choice situations. If they fail to 
acknowledge that their own perspectives frame the decision-making process, they are prone to 
entering choice situations unaware of their own blind spots, biased schemas, and that their 
perception and judgment is affected by internal and external factors, many of which are outside 
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their control (Thiel et al., 2012). This can cause them to not make use of important decision-
relevant information that is easily accessible, thus leading them to miss important aspects of the 
problems they attempt to solve (Bazerman & Moore, 2017).  
If decision-makers, on the other hand, are aware that their perspective is limited, they can 
actively seek out new information through dialogue with others. Since mental models are 
dynamic, they can be actively altered to perceive situations in new ways (Werhane et al., 2013). 
They can be reflected over and talked about. If decision-makers seek out information and 
challenge their habitual thinking, they can deepen their awareness, integrate more perspectives, 
enter choice situations with more accurate mental models of the world, and thereby increase 
their potential to make responsible decisions. 
An important question for ethical decision-making is how far managers perceive that their 
responsibility reaches and which stakeholders they pay attention to. While conventional 
stakeholder theory usually focuses on organizations’ responsibility towards contractual 
stakeholders such as employees, customers, and suppliers, Zsolnai (2006) argues that 
organizations also have a natural, non-reciprocal responsibility towards all beings that are 
impacted by their operations. This includes extended stakeholders such as nature, society, and 
future generations.  
According to Mitchell et al. (1997) managers tend to prioritize stakeholders they perceive to 
have power to influence the firm, and that have legitimate and urgent claims. Managers’ 
perceptions are, however, subject to biases that could cause them to focus too extensively on 
powerful stakeholders that demand attention (Tashman & Raelin, 2013). Less powerful 
stakeholders are more likely to be neglected, even though they could have legitimate claims. 
Managers often have a self-interest in pleasing the expectations of their most powerful 
stakeholders. They may, however, also lack knowledge and fail to understand what kind of 
obligations the firm has towards extended stakeholders. Failing to recognize the interests and 
concerns of a broad range of stakeholders, could mean that decision-makers enter choice 
situations with an insufficient understanding of the problem at hand. 
Another key issue is which dimensions of a problem decision-makers take into consideration. 
Mitroff (1998) argues that a common issue when facing problems is narrow-mindedness. This 
can lead us to find precise solutions to the wrong problem or cause us to miss important aspects 
of the problem we are trying to solve. To get a holistic understanding of the problem and its 
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consequences, Mitroff recommends that we consider four dimensions of the problem. First, 
there is a scientific/technical dimension, which is the one we usually remember to consider. 
This is considering technological tools and frameworks. Secondly, there is an 
interpersonal/social dimension, which is concerned with the social context and interpersonal 
relationships. Thirdly, there is an existential/spiritual dimension, which includes aspects such 
as values and spirituality. Lastly, there is a systemic dimension, which means examining how 
the problem fits into a larger context, for example by looking at ecological ramifications. By 
considering multiple dimensions of problems, we can obtain a deeper insight into second- and 
third-order consequences of our actions for ourselves and others, future generations and nature, 
and take a greater responsibility for avoiding unintended long-term effects of our actions (Ims 
& Zsolnai, 2006). 
 
Figure 2: Multiple stakeholders and dimensions (based on Mitroff, 1998, and Zsolnai, 2006)  
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Chapter 4: Research model 
4.1 Summary 
Thus far, I have reviewed three main topics. The first topic was related to mental models—
namely, how our attitudes, beliefs, experiences, and limited cognitive abilities influence how 
we perceive the world. The second topic was related to effective listening—that we by reducing 
our judgment can listen in a way that positively supports others’ basic psychological needs, and 
that enables us to see the world as someone else sees it and potentially be changed by it. The 
third topic was related to ethical decision-making, indicating that our blind spots, bounded 
awareness, and bounded ethicality can lure us into making narrow-minded decisions. Based on 
the literature review, I will now propose a model that explains how these concepts are related. 
4.2 Context 
First, I will briefly explain the context of the proposed model. In the previous chapter, I 
presented the cycle of choice as a model for organizational decision-making, which provides 
the overall context of my model. More specifically, I place my model within the box of “mental 
representations” of the decision-maker. Many factors can influence a decision-maker’s mental 
representations, including listening to stakeholders. The model I propose is an interpersonal, 
dyadic model suggesting that some relationships could occur in a one-to-one interaction 
between a decision-maker and one individual stakeholder, such as between a manager and an 
employee. The relationships between variables of the model are based on the literature reviewed 
in the previous chapter. 
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4.3 Proposed model 
 
Figure 3: Listening model 
As I explain the relationships within the model, I use the terms “manager” and “employee” 
instead of “decision-maker” and “stakeholder”, respectively, in order to give concrete examples 
of the model’s relationships. I also use one example of effective listening and one example of 
ineffective listening to show how the variables relate. 
What is effective listening? 
In the section on listening, I presented Rogers’ listening construct, which includes three 
components: comprehension, attentiveness, and relational aspects. I consider effective listening 
to be the degree to which someone masters these three components in an interpersonal setting. 
Thus, effective listening implies that someone is able to master the mental aspects of listening, 
such as paying attention and seeing the world from someone else’s point of view, and 
interpersonal behaviors, such as conveying understanding, clarifying uncertainties, and 
showing positive regard. 
Stakeholder’s psychological safety and basic psychological needs 
A manager who listens effectively could positively impact an employee’s basic psychological 
needs for autonomy (for example, by letting the employee control the conversation), 
competence (for example, by giving the employee the opportunity to share their expertise), and 
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relatedness (for example, by showing care and respect). Effective listening could also positively 
impact psychological safety, such as through a manager’s consistent display of positive regard.  
However, these same needs could also be thwarted by ineffective listening. A manager who 
controls conversations, interrupts, and never asks questions or conveys back their understanding 
of what an employee has expressed could negatively impact the employee’s needs for 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Similarly, managers who fail to show positive regard 
and who create fear and uncertainty could negatively impact psychological safety. 
Stakeholder expression 
When an employee’s basic psychological needs are met, they are more likely to express 
themselves. The employee can openly talk about their interests and concerns. The employee 
will likely feel that they can be their true selves to a larger extent. They can share their authentic 
being and do not have to hide behind a façade in order to meet their manager’s expectations of 
whom they should be. The employee is accepted and respected as the person they are. An 
employee who feels psychologically supported is also more likely to feel an autonomous type 
of motivation, which is associated with a broad range of positive effects for both the individual 
and the company.  
On the other hand, if an employee’s basic psychological needs are thwarted, they are less likely 
to express themselves. They might not feel they can share their interests and concerns. They 
might operate under negative stress due to the fear of retributions or negative career 
consequences. They might feel they have to hide parts of themselves because they fear they 
will not be accepted as the person they are. An employee who does not feel psychologically 
supported is also more likely to feel a controlled type of motivation, which means that the 
potential for increased organizational effectiveness and personal well-being is not reached.  
As a clarifying example, let us consider two theoretical employees: one who is effectively 
listened to (Employee Eff) and another who is ineffectively listened to (Employee Ineff). Both 
employees have three interests, I1, I2, and I3, and three concerns, C1, C2, and C3. In addition, 
both employees have a sense of how much of their true selves they dare to express (on a scale 




Employee Eff might feel that it is safe to share 90% of I1, I2, and I3 and 85% of C1, C2, and 
C3, and they might feel that they can be 95% of their true selves in the relationship. Employee 
Ineff, on the other hand, might feel that it is safe to share only 70% of I1 and I2 and 60% of C1. 
This employee does not share I3, C2, or C3 at all. The employee might feel that they must put 
on a mask to get by, showing only 40% of their true selves.  
The implication is that the effectiveness of a manager’s listening could impact the degree to 
which employees share concerns and interests and the degree to which they feel they can be 
their true selves in interactions. Thus, the effectiveness of the manager’s listening leads to two 
different effects.  
The normative effect: Dignity 
The first effect, which is normative, is the degree to which the employee is treated with dignity. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, treating someone with dignity involves acts such as 
acknowledging them, accepting them, creating safety, understanding them, validating them, and 
helping them live good lives. Effective listening contributes to all these factors through the 
support of the basic needs for autonomy, competence, relatedness, and psychological safety. It 
is a way of respecting others and creating a climate in which they can be their true selves. It is 
a way of treating others as ends in themselves. It is a way of promoting the well-being of others, 
which Hicks and Waddock (2016) argue should be at the core of ethical leadership. 
The instrumental effect: More data 
The second effect, which is instrumental, is the manager’s access to valuable data. When an 
employee speaks up, the manager will have a larger pool of data to tap into. The listening 
construct consists of different parts. Although a manager is effective at handling the 
interpersonal element of listening through supportive behaviors, there is also a comprehension 
part of listening that could moderate how much of the pool of data the manager correctly 
understands. 
For example, even if an employee feels safe enough to express 100% of their interests and 
concerns because the manager is effective at the interpersonal dimensions of listening, the 
manager must correctly understand the data in order to utilize it in a choice situation. The 
manager interprets the data through their own mental model of the world, which will, to some 
degree, distort the data. If the manager listens effectively by temporarily suspending judgment 
and making an effort to see the world as the employee sees it, the manager might gain a 90% 
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correct understanding of what the employee has expressed. Meanwhile, a manager who 
ineffectively listens from their own point of view and with judgment might acquire only a 60% 
correct comprehension.  
In either case, some data will inevitably be lost. Effective listening will, however, first increase 
the pool of data that the manager can potentially tap into because the employee feels safe to 
express more of their interests and concerns (through the interpersonal dimension). Second, 
effective listening will increase the degree to which the manager correctly understands the 
interests and concerns that the employee expresses (through better comprehension). 
4.4 What is the ethical relevance? 
If we return to the overall decision-making context (see Figure 1), we can now see how the 
model I have proposed fits into the bigger picture. The listening has, or has not, changed the 
mental model of the decision-maker. The new insights and knowledge the decision-maker has 
potentially acquired by listening to stakeholders can then be used in the decision-making (the 
choice situation). 
What ethical relevance does this have? A decision-maker who listens effectively has a higher 
probability of entering a choice situation with an accurate understanding of the interests, 
concerns, and perspectives of stakeholders. These perspectives can help the decision-maker fill 
in their own blind spots, increasing their ability to make a holistic decision. For example, the 
decision-maker might gain an understanding of important second- and third-order 
consequences that were important to consider.  
Similarly, a decision-maker who listens ineffectively might be unaware that they are missing 
important data. This means that the decision-maker enters the choice situation with an 
insufficient understanding of the problem, increasing the probability that the decision will be 
narrow-minded. The decision-maker might believe that they have a sufficient understanding of 
the problem at hand, but might in reality have created a climate in which stakeholders feel 
unsafe sharing information. In addition, the decision-maker’s evaluating tendencies might lead 
them to distort data to make it fit with their own preexisting beliefs, thereby leading them into 
an unwarranted confidence in their own perception of the problem. 
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4.5 Outside the model 
Even when the decision-maker listens effectively and gains an accurate understanding of the 
stakeholder’s perception of the world, this knowledge is not sufficient for an ethical decision to 
be made. The decision-maker must still choose to make a decision that goes beyond their narrow 
self-interests.  
The decision-maker must also judge how the various stakeholders’ perspectives fit into the 
bigger picture. Stakeholders have different interests and concerns, and not all of these can or 
should be met. The decision-maker must consider the long-term effects of the decision for a 
broad set of stakeholders from a technical, social, existential, and systemic dimension. Lastly, 
the decision-maker must incorporate these aspects into the decision itself based on a holistic 
assessment of the problem. 
Two relevant factors that I have left out of the model are self-awareness and external stressors. 
The decision-maker’s self-awareness affects their ability to listen effectively. We have an inner 
life, an inner voice, an inner flow of experiences that we can explore and become aware of. By 
realizing that we see the world through a subjective lens, we can start exploring how our own 
biases, beliefs, and experiences influence our perception of reality. We can then attempt to 
suspend our own inclination to evaluate things from our own point of view and instead try to 
see the world as the stakeholder sees it. In addition, external stressors can influence what we 
pay attention to and how effectively we listen. Time pressure and framing effects can make us 
vulnerable to seeing the world in a rigid way and cause us to shut out input from others, thereby 
increasing the probability of narrow-minded decision-making. It can also make us vulnerable 
to considering too few stakeholders and too few dimensions of the problem we face (see Figure 
2). 
4.6 Limitations 
My proposed model has some limitations. First, it is not ideal that the listening construct used 
incorporates several variables. Which parts of the listening construct are most important for 
ensuring that the listening is effective? How are stakeholder needs and psychological safety 
affected by the different aspects of listening? Is it the interpersonal supportive behaviors that 
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are most important, or is it the mental aspect? What happens if a decision-maker is effective at 
one dimension of listening, but ineffective at another? To me, it seems intuitive that the mental 
aspect of listening is the key for gaining new insights as a listener, yet it is impossible to access 
these insights if the stakeholder feels unsafe and does not express them. An improved version 
of the model should distinguish among the different variables of the listening construct to clarify 
these distinctions. 
Second, it is important to note that effective listening is just one of many factors that could 
influence stakeholder needs and psychological safety. Even when a decision-maker listens 
effectively, there is no guarantee that the stakeholder will feel safe to express themselves. The 
history of the relationship, trust, and other factors could intervene. In addition, individual 
differences could affect the relationships in the model. Therefore, effective listening must be 
considered as one of many factors important for decision-makers to consider. Similarly, 
effective listening is just one of several factors that impact the degree to which stakeholders are 
treated with dignity. For example, what if a decision-maker listens effectively, but never 
incorporates any of the interests and concerns of powerless stakeholders into the decisions? 
Thus, effective listening must be considered a potential positive contributor in combination 
with other factors.   
Third, effective listening is just one of several factors that could influence the mental model of 
a decision-maker. Even when a decision-maker listens effectively and learns something, there 
is no guarantee that this will lead to more ethical decisions. As previously discussed, each 
relationship in the four-stage model of choice (see Figure 1) could break down. If a decision-
maker changes their mental representations of a problem after listening to a stakeholder, it does 
not necessarily mean that the decision-maker will actively use these insights. In many cases, 
listening to stakeholders will not provide any new insights that the decision-maker was not 
already aware of. 
Fourth, there is a cost associated with effective listening. Listening takes time, and time is 
limited. The importance of listening will depend on the problem at hand. Some problems will 
probably require decision-makers to listen well and gather a wide range of perspectives in order 
to make a wise decision. However, many decisions are trivial, and even when a decision is 
important, the decision-maker sometimes already has a sufficient understanding of the problem. 
In either case, decision-makers must at some point cut off what is irrelevant and settle for a 
solution they feel is adequate. Although decision-makers should temporarily suspend judgment 
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to understand others clearly, their roles eventually require them to judge. If not, they risk 
entering a state of decision paralysis in which they are constantly searching for new input and 
unable to choose from among the available alternatives.  
Fifth, when we listen effectively, seeing the world as someone else sees it, we risk being 
changed ourselves. This could enrich our understanding and fill in our blind spots, but it could 
also make us vulnerable to losing our sense of who we are. Bråten (1973) argued that, in 
interactions with others, we could be seduced by the model power of the other person—that is, 
their model of the world could feel so convincing that we end up neglecting our own 
experiences and knowledge. This could lead us to submit to the other person’s way of thinking, 
reducing our ability to reason clearly based on our own values and experiences. If there are 
stakeholder conflicts, it is also likely that some stakeholders will actively attempt to manipulate 
the decision-maker to serve their own interests. Thus, there is a risk that listening could 
negatively impact our mental representations. If we are aware of this possibility and have a 
clear sense of our own values, some of the risk could likely be mitigated. This requires us to 
listen effectively to ourselves in order to recognize how the interaction might have impacted 
us. Yet even when we have this awareness, we might change subconsciously and never realize 
it.  
Finally, in an organizational context, decision-makers are typically leaders, not psychologists. 
Although the focus of this thesis is decision-makers’ willingness to open up and potentially be 
influenced by others through effective listening, leaders must also influence others. There is a 
time for listening, but also a time for expressing one’s own values and opinions in order to 
create the change that the organization requires based on one’s own sound judgment and total 
assessment of what the situation requires. Thus, finding the golden mean between listening too 
much and too little is a challenge that leaders must tackle. 
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Chapter 5: Case findings 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 6, I will consider the research question in light of the decision-making that led to the 
two Boeing 737 Max accidents. In this chapter, I will provide background information for the 
case, and present findings from the thematic analysis of the investigation report and the content 
analysis of Boeing’s annual reports. This chapter is structured as follows: 
Chapter 5.2 provides background information for the case and explains key terms. 
Chapter 5.3 provides a timeline of the case. 
Chapter 5.4 presents findings from the thematic analysis of the investigation report. 
Chapter 5.5 presents findings from the content analysis of the annual reports. 
5.2 Background 
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed 13 minutes after departure on a domestic 
flight in Indonesia, killing the 189 passengers and crew. Only five months later, on March 10, 
2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, a flight between the capitals of Ethiopia and Kenya, 
crashed six minutes after departure, killing the 157 persons on board. In both cases, a brand-
new Boeing 737 Max aircraft was used. And in both cases, a new safety critical system, MCAS 
(maneuvering characteristics augmentation system), forced the nose of the aircraft to pitch 
downwards, putting the aircraft in a deadly dive which the pilots were unable to counter (The 
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (HTIC), 2020). 
The story begins in 2010, when Airbus, Boeing’s main competitor, launched the Airbus A320 
Neo, an aircraft which was significantly more fuel-efficient than Boeing’s 737 NG (Next 
generation), Boeing’s best-selling aircraft. Airbus’ value proposition was strong, and Boeing 
had to respond. In 2011, Boeing started their development of the Boeing 737 Max, which would 
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be based on the same design as the Boeing 737 NG aircraft but be significantly more fuel-
efficient (HTIC, 2020). 
Because the Max was a successor to the 737 NG, Boeing was making changes to an already 
approved design. This allowed Boeing to go through a simplified certification process, in which 
they mainly had to document any deviations from the approved design to the FAA (Federal 
Aviation Agency).  Staying within this simplified process gave Boeing incentives to minimize 
changes to the aircraft, since major changes would have made the certification process more 
complex. However, some changes had to be made to make the aircraft more fuel-efficient. 
Compared to the NG, the Max was heavier and had larger engines with a different placement. 
These changes led to flight stability issues during certain conditions. A key issue was that the 
aircraft’s nose was more likely to pitch upwards, which increased the risk of stalling. To address 
this, Boeing created a new flight control software system, MCAS, which could automatically 
activate to counter this tendency by forcing the nose of the aircraft downwards (HTIC, 2020). 
One of the most important financial goals of the Max program was to reach a training 
certification of level B from the FAA, which would mean that pilots that were already flying 
the 737 NG could transition to the Max without requiring simulator training. This would 
significantly increase Boeing’s value proposition by saving airliners substantial training costs. 
However, Boeing feared that the MCAS system had the potential to lead to larger certification 
and training requirements. They therefore decided to characterize the MCAS as an extension to 
the speed trim system, instead of emphasizing that it was a new function (HTIC, 2020). 
Boeing had strong financial incentives to avoid jeopardizing the level B training objective. Even 
though the FAA had not decided on which level of training that would be required for the Max, 
Boeing early on actively marketed the aircraft as only requiring level B training towards 
potential customers. Boeing also entered into an agreement with the airliner Southwest, in 
which Boeing would be highly financially penalized if they failed to achieve level B 
certification (HTIC, 2020). 
During the development of the Max, Boeing systematically downplayed the importance of 
MCAS towards the FAA. The FAA had delegated a lot of their oversight to authorized 
representatives (AR), which were Boeing employees who had been given authority by the FAA 
to validate that systems complied with FAA requirements. The AR representatives, who thus 
had conflicting interests between Boeing and the FAA, failed to inform the FAA about 
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important safety concerns that they had raised internally at Boeing. Thus, by delegating its 
oversight to Boeing, the FAA’s oversight lost a lot of its effectiveness (HTIC, 2020). 
During the development process, Boeing was under strong commercial pressure. They were 
already experiencing problems with another aircraft program (the 787 Dreamliner), and they 
had to equalize Airbus’ competitive advantage. Many employees at Boeing felt that the 
commercial pressure had safety implications, and concerns were raised within several 
departments that quality was being compromised. A Boeing AR representative did also address 
MCAS directly, by raising concerns about the potential dangers of repeated MCAS activation. 
The AR representative also raised concerns that the MCAS only took input from one AOA 
(angle-of-attack) sensor, instead of two, which meant that if the sensor malfunctioned, it could 
give the MCAS erroneous input and cause it to activate. In both the Lion Air and Ethiopian 
Airlines crashes, this happened, and the nose of the aircraft was forced down repeatedly by the 
MCAS system. Because Boeing had not been transparent about the system, pilots were unaware 
of it, and did not know how to correctly solve the problems that arose (HTIC, 2020). 
The House Committee report (2020) shows that there was a climate of undue pressure and fear 
of retributions for speaking up about safety issues at both Boeing and the FAA. It shows that 
there was a culture of concealment at Boeing, and that the FAA did not perform its regulatory 
duties effectively. It shows that the recommendations of technical experts were overruled by 
senior management, and that key executives felt pressure to deliver financial results. It shows 
that employee concerns were not addressed, and that the production of the 737 Max was ramped 
up despite several red flags. After the first crash, both Boeing and the FAA blamed the pilots, 
instead of addressing the faulty design of the MCAS system and providing pilots with the 
training they actually needed. 
The House Committee’s main findings are as follows: 
• “The MAX crashes were not the result of a singular failure, technical mistake, or 
mismanaged event. They were the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical 
assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s 
management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA–the pernicious result of 
regulatory capture on the part of the FAA with respect to its responsibilities to perform 
robust oversight of Boeing and to ensure the safety of the flying public. The facts laid 
out in this report document a disturbing pattern of technical miscalculations and 
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troubling management misjudgment made by Boeing. It also illuminates numerous 
oversight lapses and accountability gaps by the FAA that played a significant role in the 
737 MAX crashes” (HTIC, 2020, pp. 6–7) 
• “The FAA failed to ensure the safety of the traveling public” (HTIC, 2020, p. 15) 
• “Costs, schedule, and production pressures undermined safety of the 737 MAX” (HTIC, 
2020, p. 17) 
• “Boeing failed to appropriately classify MCAS as a safety-critical system, concealed 
critical information about MCAS from pilots, and sought to diminish focus on MCAS 
as a “new function” in order to avoid increased costs, and “greater certification and 
training impact”” (HTIC, 2020, p. 19) 
• “Boeing concealed information from the FAA, its customers, and pilots that the AOA 
disagree alert were inoperable on most of the 737 MAX fleet, despite their operation 
being “mandatory” on all 737 MAX aircraft.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 22) 
• “Boeing’s economic incentives led the company to a significant lack of transparency 
with the FAA, its customers, and 737 MAX pilots regarding pilot training requirements 
and negatively compromised safety.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 24) 
5.3 Timeline 
2010 Airbus’ A320 Neo is launched 
2011 Boeing 737 Max development starts 
November, 2012 A Boeing test pilot uses more than 10 seconds in a simulator scenario 
to respond to uncommanded MCAS activation, a “catastrophic” result 
that Boeing does not share with the FAA or its customers 
2013 A Boeing engineer’s request to install a synthetic airspeed indicator on 
the Max is rejected due to concerns that it could jeopardize the pilot 
training objective 
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June, 2013 A Boeing AR approves that MCAS can be described as an addition to 
the speed trim system instead as a new function because of a fear of 
greater certification and training requirements 
July, 2014 Boeing markets to potential customers that the 737 Max will not 
require simulator training, even though the FAA still has not made its 
decision on this issue 
2015 A Boeing AR raises a concern about whether the MCAS is vulnerable 
to single AOA sensor failures 
2016 Michael Teal, chief project engineer, is given restricted stock options 
after the Max’ first flight for keeping the Max’ production schedule 
March, 2016 Keith Leverkuhn, general manager of the 737 Max program, and 
Michael Teal approve a redesign of the MCAS that increases the 
system’s authority to move the aircraft’s stabilizer. Boeing thereafter, 
with FAA’s approval, remove references to MCAS from Boeing’s 
flight crew operations manual 
June, 2016 After a Max test flight, a Boeing AR raises a concern over the safety 
implications of repeated MCAS activation 
August, 2016 The FAA decides that simulator training is not required for pilots 
transitioning to the Max from the NG. In fact, only two hours of 
computer-based training is needed 
September, 2016 Boeing grants its technical pilots an excellence award after having 
achieved the level B training objective 
March, 2017 The FAA certifies the Max 
May, 2017 Airliners that are inquiring about Max simulator training are strongly 




August, 2017 Boeing is aware that the AOA (angle-of-attack) disagree alert is not 
functioning on most of the 737 Max aircraft worldwide. Boeing does 
not inform the FAA or its customers. A Boeing AR agrees to postpone 
addressing the issue through a software update until 2020, when the 
launch of a new version of the 737 Max is planned 
June, 2018 Ed Pierson, a production plant supervisor, raises concerns with senior 
Boeing management about production and schedule pressures that he 
thinks have safety implications 
October 29, 2018 Lion Air Flight 610 crashes 
November, 2018 Boeing and the FAA issue advisories for pilots, but do still not mention 
MCAS by name. After customers explicitly ask about MCAS, Boeing 
decides to describe the system 
December, 2018 FAA conducts a risk assessment (based on an overly optimistic 
assessment that 99/100 pilots will respond correctly to uncommanded 
MCAS activation) that shows that without any fix to the MCAS there 
will potentially be 15 more fatal crashes during the Max lifetime (one 
fatal accident every second year), leading to 2900 deaths 
After the first crash Boeing still asserts that MCAS does not affect flight safety, and 
recommends to the FAA that reading printed material describing 
MCAS is sufficient and that simulator training is not needed 
March 10, 2019 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashes 
March 11, 2019 China grounds the Max 
March 12, 2019 European Union grounds the Max 
March 13, 2019 United States grounds the Max 
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5.4 Results: Thematic analysis 
5.4.1 Theme one: Goal-oriented behavior 
This theme is about how the commercial focus at Boeing affected their operations. 
The report shows that the goal of achieving level B training was considered as critical for 
achieving the financial objectives of the Max program. 
This carries tremendous risk to the Program,” wrote Mr. Forkner, “as differences greater 
than Level B will be unrecoverable for our early NG/MAX customers like [redacted], 
due to simulator availability. (HTIC, 2020, p. 147) 
 
“Failure to obtain Level B training for RCAS is a planet-killer for the MAX,” wrote Mr. 
Forkner. (HTIC, 2020, p. 155)  
The importance of keeping the training objective intact impacted how pilot checklists were 
designed. 
Mr. Forkner’s emails and instant messages show how closely intertwined the Level B 
(nonsimulator) training goal was with technical decisions that affected training. In July 
2014, for example, the Level B training goal overshadowed discussions Mr. Forkner 
had with a colleague concerning the development of pilot checklists for the Flight Crew 
Training Manual. As related to the specific checklists they were developing, Mr. 
Forkner advised that they follow “the path with the least risk to Level B” and “sell” an 
action pertaining to trim technique as a “very intuitive basic pilot skill.” 
Mr. Forkner’s colleague cautioned: “I fear that skill is not very intuitive any more with 
the younger pilots and those who have become too reliant on automation.” 
Mr. Forkner responded: “Probably true, but it’s the box we’re painted into with the Level 
B training requirements.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 155) 
It affected how Boeing presented the new MCAS functionality. 
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However, a little more than two weeks after Mr. Teal sent his May 2013 email about 
MCAS and “pilot differences training,” several Boeing employees had a meeting to 
specifically discuss MCAS and the impact it could have on pilot training and 
certification requirements for the 737 MAX aircraft. An email summarizing that 
meeting said, “If we emphasize MCAS is a new function there may be greater 
certification and training impact.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 150) 
It affected how Boeing responded to customers who were inquiring about Max simulator 
training. 
Once the FAA obviated the need for simulator-based differences training on the MAX 
in August 2016, a decision that largely affected U.S. airlines, and after the MAX was 
certified in March 2017, Boeing aggressively discouraged foreign-flagged airlines from 
setting their own simulator training requirements. In particular, emails from Mr. Forkner 
concerning the company’s foreign airline customers show strong opposition to simulator 
training and grossly inappropriate language in reacting to airlines that even inquired 
about simulator training needs for their MAX pilots. Mr. Forkner also boasted that his 
efforts to talk airlines out of simulator training was of significant financial benefit to 
Boeing. (HTIC, 2020, p. 156) 
It impacted Boeing’s engineering decisions. 
Some of the former Boeing engineers interviewed for the article noted how Boeing’s 
desire not to have simulator training had a detrimental impact on the MAX’s engineering 
decisions. One former employee said that internal Boeing performance reviews focused 
on cost savings and not safety. The article emphasized that corporate pressure regarding 
simulator training on the MAX is “essential to understanding how an emphasis on costs 
twisted a process that’s supposed to produce the best, safest planes.” The Committee’s 
investigation has revealed similar findings. (HTIC, 2020, p. 162) 
 
Unfortunately, the request to install synthetic airspeed on the 737 MAX was rejected by 
Boeing management because its introduction would have been too costly and may have 
resulted in the FAA requiring simulator training on the MAX – something that would 
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have jeopardized the 737 MAX program’s clear and consistent goal to avoid simulator 
training requirements. (HTIC, 2020, p. 170) 
It affected Boeing’s interactions with the FAA. 
In November 2015, Mr. Forkner also wrote about the need to “push back very hard” 
against the AEG regarding potential simulator training requirements and said he “will 
likely need support at the highest levels” at Boeing in negotiating with the FAA 
regarding such requirements for the 737 MAX’s Roll Command Alerting System 
(RCAS). (HTIC, 2020, p. 155) 
Reaching important goals was incentivized. 
To thank Mr. Teal for his leadership of the 737 MAX program and for helping to keep 
the program on schedule, Mr. Teal received a bonus in the form of restricted Boeing 
stock shares after the first flight of the 737 MAX in January 2016. (HTIC, 2020, p. 117) 
 
In fact, the Committee has learned that in September 2016, one month after the FAA 
provided Boeing with provisional approval for Level B (non-simulator) training for 737 
MAX pilots, Mr. Forkner and his team of technical pilots that had been promoting Level 
B training were granted an award for their efforts from Boeing. An internal Boeing email 
said that the technical pilot team received the company’s Commercial Aviation Services 
(CAS) Service Excellence Award on September 14, 2016, “along with the Training 
Development Team for their role is [sic] developing the MAX Level B differences 
training which was approved by the FAA.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 158) 
In addition to reaching the training goal, Boeing also faced ambitious production goals.  
For those working on the factory floor and supervising the monumental task of 
assembling the 737 MAX aircraft at this rapid production rate, however, the problems 
they encountered were intensified by the pressure to produce. In the spring and summer 
of 2018, with literally thousands of MAX orders on the books and production ramping 
up, employees at the Renton plant were working significant overtime, including back-
to-back weekends. Like any large-scale industrial manufacturing facility, safety and 
quality control were key concerns. But the Committee’s investigation has found that in 
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at least some cases those concerns appeared to take a back seat to Boeing management’s 
concerns about staying on schedule on the 737 MAX production line. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 
173–174) 
Boeing implemented measures to emphasize the importance of keeping the schedule. 
“[O]ne of the mantras that we had was the value of a day, and making sure that we were 
being prudent with our time,” said Mr. Leverkuhn, “that we were being thorough, but 
yet, that there was a schedule that needed to be met…” (HTIC, 2020, p. 168) 
 
To remind Boeing employees of how critical sticking to the program’s schedule was, 
Boeing’s management introduced “countdown clocks” into the MAX program, and they 
made certain that they were easy to spot. (HTIC, 2020, p. 168) 
Increasing productivity was a focus of CEO Muilenburg. 
On a January 31, 2018, fourth quarter 2017 earnings call with the media and aviation 
industry analysts, Dennis Muilenburg, then-Chairman, President and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of The Boeing Company at the time discussed the Renton facility’s 737 
production line. 
I had a chance to be out on the line again just recently. And they’re implementing 
productivity improvements, production line flow improvements, tack time 
improvements, all while rolling the MAX into the line.  
So while it’s a challenging situation, it’s a high-volume line, fast moving line. 
We’re continuing to ramp up while we introduce the MAX into the line. It 
requires daily focus and daily attention. The ramp up continues on track, and 
we’re not seeing issues or any problems that are out of the ordinary. And I remain 
confident that we’ll achieve our MAX ramp-up goals for 2018. (HTIC, 2020, p. 
173) 
Tight schedules negatively impacted the Max simulator program. 
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In April 2018, a Boeing employee lamented: “This is a direct result of a pour [sic] plan 
which I objected to repeatedly since day 1. The schedule simply did not permit for any 
corrective actions to be taken…” (HTIC, 2020, p. 160) 
 
In May 2018, a frustrated Boeing employee mentioned it took six hours to resolve the 
large number of deficiency reports and complained about Boeing management pushing 
forward despite the problems. “[T]hey are ploughing forward regardless of the danger, 
failing to appreciate the implication of Boeing failing to qualify a Boeing device…” he 
wrote. “They are failing to appreciate that a delay would be less costly than the incurred 
costs…. (HTIC, 2020, p. 160) 
 
They were also deeply troubled by Boeing’s poor management of the simulator 
program, lack of adequate engineering support, and schedule pressure that they felt was 
driving a rushed process resulting in mistakes and apprehension about the quality of the 




5.4.2 Theme two: Feelings of pressure 
This theme is about personal pressure that was felt by management at Boeing and FAA. It is 
also about the pressure employees felt to prioritize the commercial aspects of the operations. 
Boeing’s contract with Southwest put the company under significant pressure to achieve certain 
goals. 
As part of the contract, Boeing agreed to pay Southwest $1 million per MAX airplane 
that Boeing delivered to Southwest if its pilots were unable to operate the 737 NG and 
737 MAX “interchangeably” “due to any reason. On top of that, Boeing agreed to 
reimburse Southwest for any training expenses that exceeded 10 hours if the FAA 
required more than 10 hours of pilot training and/or required flight simulator training. 
That agreement left Boeing with significant financial exposure if it failed to obtain Level 
B (non-simulator) training requirements from the FAA. 
When Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed in March 2019, Southwest had 34 MAX 
aircraft in its fleet. In October 2019, one year after the Lion Air flight 610 crash, 
Southwest had 246 firm MAX orders, 34 of its MAX aircraft were grounded, and it had 
the option to purchase 115 additional MAX aircraft. Thus, if the FAA had required pilot 
simulator training for MAX pilots, Boeing would have been required to pay Southwest 
nearly $400 million to offset the simulator-based pilot training requirements. (HTIC, 
2020, p. 148) 
Even before the FAA had decided on the Max training requirements, Boeing marketed the Max 
as limited to training level B, which put pressure on the FAA. 
Boeing was not simply pushing hard to obtain Level B pilot training, it was blurring the 
lines between what it “hoped” the FAA would determine and the FAA’s actual decision 
concerning pilot training requirements. In 2014 marketing materials to a potential 
customer airline, for instance, Boeing had slides that said pilot training would be 
“limited to Level B Training only” and only included a small note indicating that this 
was “pending 737 MAX certification.” 
In addition, despite Mr. Teal’s assertion in the transcribed interview that Boeing was 
waiting for the FAA to make a determination on the MAX pilot training requirements, 
in July 2014, more than two years before the FAA would complete its pilot training 
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evaluations and flight testing to make a determination, Boeing boldly claimed in a press 
release that no simulator training would be required. (HTIC, 2020, p. 145) 
The FAA had also previously, related to the 787 Dreamliner, felt pressure from Boeing. 
While none of these altered 787 Dreamliner aircraft were delivered to Boeing’s 
customers prior to FAA’s approval of the design change, one FAA official involved in 
this issue told Committee staff that he believed this was a way for Boeing to game the 
system. By the time Boeing alerted the FAA about the changes, it had proceeded so far 
into production that it could claim that making a change was untenable in view of a tight 
delivery schedule and argue that it would lose millions of dollars if it was forced to scrap 
the wing sets it had already produced. As a result, FAA managers were under 
tremendous pressure to approve Boeing’s design changes, this FAA official observed. 
(HTIC, 2020, p. 82) 
Employees and managers at the FAA felt that the pressure from the commercial industry had 
safety implications. 
It also found that, “Employees and managers reported that external pressure from 
industry is strong and is impacting the AVS safety culture.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 75) 
The report indicates that managers at Boeing were under pressure to deliver on their goals. 
Chief Technical Pilot Forkner sent an internal email 28. March 2017, stating:  
I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulator 
training required to transition from the NG to the MAX. Boeing will not allow that to 
happen. We’ll go face to face with any regulator who tries to make that a requirement. 
(HTIC, 2020, p. 156) 
In an internal message, Forkner expressed his frustration with airliners that inquired about 
simulator training. 
“Now friggin Lion Air might need a sim to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their 
own stupidity. I’m scrambling to figure out how to unscrew this now! idiots” That same 
month Mr. Forkner emailed a colleague, “I’m putting out fires with the [redacted] who 




2020, p. 156) 
This frustration seems to have been related to the importance of keeping the training objective 
intact. 
However, Mr. Forkner’s hard sell tactics to dissuade airlines from simulator training 
was the result of an implied message from Boeing management to discourage such 
training because of the threat it posed to the marketing strategy and ultimately the 
profitability of the 737 MAX program. (HTIC, 2020, p. 158) 
 
Obtaining Level B training must have come as a tremendous relief to Mr. Forkner. It is 
clear from emails and instant messages provided to the Committee by Boeing that Mr. 
Forkner was under tremendous pressure to ensure Boeing achieved Level B training on 
the MAX. In a December 2014 email to a Boeing colleague, 20 months prior to the 
FAA’s decision on the MAX’s training requirements, Mr. Forkner expressed concern 
based on his responsibility to coordinate training requirements with the FAA’s Flight 
Standardization Board. “[I]f we lose Level B,” he wrote, the blame “will be thrown 
squarely on my shoulders,” conveying his feeling that he would be held personally 
responsible by Boeing’s leadership for the financial consequences of not obtaining 
Level B training. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 154–155) 
 
In his interview with Committee staff, Mr. Teal also claimed that he did not believe 
MCAS was a concern in regard to the impact it could have on obtaining Level B training. 
“I don’t recall the MCAS ever being a concern associated with level B training,” he said. 
That statement, however, does not square with the facts. In May 2013, Mr. Teal sent an 
email to senior leaders on the MAX team regarding significant risk issues. That email 
very specifically tied the inclusion of MCAS in the aircraft to potentially jeopardizing 
Boeing’s goal of obtaining Level B training. Specifically, the email said: “Differences 
Pilot Training: Ensuring that the level of change on the MAX keeps the Differences 
training to 16 hours or less of Level B training. Concerns include the impact of the 
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resolution of 25.1322 trade and the Autopilot roll saturation change driven by the 
addition of MCAS to the flight controls system.” (HTIC, 2020, pp. 149–150) 
A survey indicated that Boeing ARs experienced undue pressure. 
Further, the adoption of an ODA organizational structure exposed Boeing-appointed 
Ars to greater risks of undue influence from managers. For example, the JATR reported 
signs of undue pressure on ARs who perform delegated functions “which may be 
attributed to conflicting priorities and an environment that does not support FAA 
requirements.” This is consistent with Boeing’s own internal survey, conducted in 2016, 
at the height of the 737 MAX’s certification activities and provided to the Committee 
from a whistleblower, which found that 39 percent of Boeing ARs that responded 
perceived potential “undue pressure” and 29 percent were concerned about 
consequences if they reported potential undue pressure. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 69–70) 
There are also indications that employees felt fear of retaliation for raising issues. 
According to the Seattle Times, the Boeing employee who filed the complaint said 
management was more concerned with cost and schedule than safety or quality. The 
complaint also alleged that Boeing hid inflight safety incident data from the European 
Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), according to the newspaper. Further, it reported 
that the employee who filed the complaint expressed concerns about retaliation for even 
raising these issues internally at Boeing. The Boeing employee apparently wrote, that 
given “the nature of this complaint, the fear of retaliation is high, despite all official 
assurances that this should not be the case. There is a suppressive cultural attitude 
towards criticism of corporate policy – especially if that criticism comes as a result of 
fatal accidents,” wrote the employee. (HTIC, 2020, p. 172) 
Boeing’s CEO expressed that safety always was prioritized despite commercial pressure. 
Mr. Muilenburg, did, however, acknowledge that “pressure” exists but suggested that it 
never interferes with safety. “Now, I will say it is true that we have competitive 
pressures every day,” admitted Mr. Muilenburg. “We operate in a tough, globally 
competitive world. But that never, never takes priority over safety,” he said. (HTIC, 




5.4.3 Theme three: Lack of transparency 
This theme is about the lack of transparency and under-communication between Boeing and its 
key stakeholders. 
To avoid increased pilot training, Boeing had incentives to downplay the MCAS functionality. 
As the MCAS strategy made clear, it was important to Boeing to limit any impact on 
increased certification and pilot training. Increases in either would have increased the 
cost of the 737 MAX program. Three key concerns: 1) that MCAS had the potential to 
increase certification scrutiny; 2) that MCAS could have led to greater pilot training 
requirements; and 3) that references to MCAS in training and other manuals could 
increase costs to both Boeing and its customer airlines, appear to have driven Boeing’s 
efforts to downplay MCAS as much as possible. 
To achieve those objectives, Boeing appears to have pushed the idea that MCAS was 
simply an extension of the Speed Trim System. While technically this is accurate, 
describing MCAS that way helped to obscure the fact that MCAS was a new function 
on commercial aircraft. To be clear, Boeing provided information to the FAA about 
MCAS, including some in which MCAS was characterized as new. However, the 
rationale for describing MCAS that way was clearly laid out in the meeting minutes 
referenced above that approved a strategy to help Boeing attempt to shield itself against 
greater certification and training impact. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 98–99) 
Boeing did not inform the FAA about critical data. 
Despite the fact that Boeing knew that the consequences could be “catastrophic” if a 
pilot did not react quickly enough to uncommanded MCAS activation, and the fact that 
Boeing cited this fact repeatedly over the years in their internal coordination sheets on 
MCAS, based on their own internal test data, no one at Boeing apparently informed the 
FAA about this critical data. Between 2015 and 2018 Boeing issued six separate 
coordination sheets on MCAS that referenced the “catastrophic” consequences of a 
greater than 10-second pilot response time. At least four Boeing ARs, reviewed, 
prepared, approved and/or were copied on these coordination sheets. The Committee 
has been unable to find any indication that any of these ARs informed the FAA about 
this critical test data. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 114–115) 
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Nor did Boeing share information about the MCAS functionality with pilots. 
Boeing not only discounted concerns from its own engineers that in hindsight proved 
remarkably pertinent to improving the safety of the 737 MAX, but it also did not share 
certain information about what it knew about MCAS with— regulators, and it chose not 
to inform the vast majority of MAX pilots about the very existence of MCAS. The 
unions representing pilots at American Airlines and Southwest Airlines, both of which 
operate the 737 MAX, allege their members were not made aware of MCAS and the 
system’s ability to command the 737 MAX into a dive until after the Lion Air crash. 
(HTIC, 2020, pp. 117–118) 
 
Nevertheless, this information was not shared with MAX pilots, and references to 
MCAS were eventually removed from 737 MAX related documents provided to air 
carriers, including Southwest Airlines, at Boeing’s request. (HTIC, 2020, p. 118) 
Boeing did not share information about a problem related to a technical malfunction that 
affected 80% of the Max aircraft. 
In essence, by its actions, Boeing chose to conceal this fact from the FAA, affected 
customers, and MAX pilots. Most astoundingly, Boeing continued to manufacture and 
deliver scores of MAX aircraft with non-functioning AOA Disagree alerts, without 
informing the FAA, airlines, or pilots about the fact that the alert, though described in 
technical materials provided to airlines, was not functioning on those airplanes. (HTIC, 
2020, p. 128) 
After the first accident, Max pilots were deprived of safety critical information. 
The Boeing OMB failed to directly alert crews to the fact that the Lion Air pilots were 
overcome by multiple warnings and alerts leading to confusion in the cockpit. It also 
did not reference MCAS. (HTIC, 2020, p. 196) 
 
Neither the FAA’s AD nor Boeing’s OMB mentioned MCAS, depriving MAX pilots of 
important information. (HTIC, 2020, p. 198) 
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5.4.4 Theme four: Concern for stakeholders 
This theme is about concern for stakeholders. 
Managers at Boeing were concerned about the financial impact of a production halt. 
The Seattle Times also reported that some work groups at the plant had “asked their 
managers about perhaps stopping the production lines in order to catch up” on all of the 
half-finished airplanes that were accumulating at the Boeing factory. “Managers have 
responded categorically that a pause cannot happen because of the severe impact it 
would have on suppliers, on airline customers and on the company’s stock price,” wrote 
the Seattle Times. (HTIC, 2020, p. 179) 
Leaders at FAA were also concerned about financial outcomes. 
According to the survey results, “Many believe that AVS senior leaders are overly 
concerned with achieving the business-oriented outcomes of industry stakeholders and 
are not held accountable for safety-related decisions. (HTIC, 2020, p. 75) 
At Boeing, the concern about financial outcomes impacted behaviors toward other stakeholders. 
In December 2017, Mr. Forkner informed a colleague in an instant message exchange 
that he made a foreign airline “feel stupid about trying to require any additional training 
requirements.” “… I just jedi mind tricked this [sic] fools,” Mr. Forkner wrote. “I should 
be given $1000 every time I take one of these calls,” he said, and then added “I save this 
company a sick amount of $$$$” (HTIC, 2020, p. 157) 
Internally at Boeing, one employee was concerned about the pilots. 
In discussing whether or not to inform 737 MAX pilots about the inoperable AOA 
Disagree alert through an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB), one Boeing employee 
wrote to a colleague on October 5, 2017, “I still think we need a bulletin to let them [the 
pilots] know what they may be missing….” The employee’s colleague responded by 
recommending Boeing send a Fleet Team Digest, rather than an OMB, because the 
inoperable AOA Disagree alert was not considered a safety issue and because there are 
no specific crew procedures to deal with a non-functioning alert. In the end, Boeing 
never sent either notice to MAX pilots. (HTIC, 2020, p. 130) 
65 
One plant supervisor was concerned about his workers and what the pressure could lead to. 
In particular, in June 2018, a Boeing plant supervisor at the Renton final assembly 
facility began to raise serious concerns with senior Boeing management regarding safety 
and quality control problems he was witnessing in the production of the 737 MAX. 
(HTIC, 2020, p. 174) 
 
Scott, I have some safety concerns that I need to share with you as the leader of the 737 
Program,” wrote Mr. Pierson.  “Today we have 38 unfinished airplanes located outside 
the factory. The following concerns are based on my own observations and 30 years of 
aviation safety experience.” Mr. Pierson cited two key concerns. “My first concern is 
that our workforce is exhausted. …. Fatigued employees make mistakes,” he warned. 
“My second concern is schedule pressure (combined with fatigue) is creating a culture 
where employees are either deliberately or unconsciously circumventing established 
processes.” 
Mr. Pierson detailed some of these specific concerns and said these issues could lead to 
“inadvertently imbedding safety hazard(s) into our airplanes. As a retired Naval Officer 
and former Squadron Commanding Officer, I know how dangerous even the smallest of 
defects can be to the safety of an airplane. Frankly right now,” he wrote, “all my internal 
warning bells are going off. And for the first time in my life, I’m sorry to say that I’m 
hesitant about putting my family on a Boeing airplane. …. I fear serious process 
breakdowns will continue to occur if we continue pushing our employees to the limit,” 
he wrote. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 175–176) 
Some employees were more focused on other types of stakeholders. 
In February 2018, a Boeing employee said there were 180 discrepancy reports (DRs) 
with the MAX simulator in England at its London Gatwick (LGW) site. “Honesty is the 
only way in this job – integrity when lives are on the line on the aircraft and training 
programs shouldn’t be taken with a pinch of salt,” wrote one frustrated Boeing 
employee. “Would you put your family on a MAX simulator trained aircraft? I 




5.4.5 Theme five: Not listened to 
This theme is about the concerns of employees, and how they were not listened to. 
The report shows that FAA management did not listen to their technical experts. 
Exactly one week later, on March 1, 2019, FAA management overturned the BASOO’s 
decision and allowed Boeing to continue producing the 787 Dreamliner without the 
copper foil to the dismay of FAA’s technical experts. In short, following Boeing’s 
appeal, the FAA reversed its decision, rejecting the safety concerns of its own technical 
experts.  
The issue, however, continued to concern FAA technical experts even after the FAA’s 
official ruling. As one FAA expert wrote in an email on June 14, 2019, to seven of his 
colleagues, “This is clearly a contentious issue and Boeing is rushing the certification 
so they can deliver airplanes.” In a separate memo to FAA management on June 27, 
2019, an FAA employee wrote of his concerns that FAA management was delegating 
the System Safety Assessment to Boeing simply because the FAA could not “support 
the airplane delivery schedule.” He went on to say, “I do not agree that delivery 
schedules should influence our safety decisions and areas of safety critical findings, nor 
is this consistent with our safety principles.” (HTIC, 2020, pp. 81–82) 
Not being listened to created feelings of demoralization within the FAA. 
In his testimony to the Committee, Mr. Collins recounted how during his early years at 
the FAA, he experienced a much different safety culture where managers and designated 
engineering representatives worked collaboratively with an applicant to resolve design 
deficiencies. More recently, according to Mr. Collins, FAA’s safety culture has been 
negatively transformed. Today, FAA’s management has permitted manufacturers to 
produce airplanes that do not comply with safety standards, according to Mr. Collins. 
This has jeopardized aviation safety and demoralized FAA’s critically important 
technical workforce that has strongly opposed those decisions. (HTIC, 2020, p. 80) 
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“There is no respect for an expert culture that has existed through years of experience. 
There is no acknowledgement of recommendations made by experts or an explanation 
about why a different decision was made.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 69) 
The plant supervisor Pierson did not feel that his perspective was acknowledged. 
Mr. Pierson recalled telling Mr. Campbell: ‘‘In … military operations, if we have these 
kinds of indications of unstable safety type of things, we would stop.’’ Mr. Pierson was 
attempting to highlight his previous recommendation that the Renton plant’s production 
line should temporarily cease operation because of his significant safety concerns. Mr. 
Campbell responded: ‘‘The military is not a profit-making organization,’’ according to 
Mr. Pierson. (HTIC, 2020, p. 177) 
This consequently led to his exit. 
The supervisor, Edward Pierson, voluntarily retired early in August 2018 primarily due 
to his belief that Boeing management was not taking these issues seriously enough or 
confronting them thoroughly enough to adequately address his safety concerns. (HTIC, 
2020, p. 174) 
However, he still persisted and attempted to get heard, but got no answer. 
On February 19, 2019, Mr. Pierson escalated his concerns yet again, this time to 
Boeing’s Board of Directors—all of them. He sent a detailed four-page letter that 
included several attachments to the dozen members of Boeing’s Board of Directors. He 
summarized his concerns and requested that the Board look into them. He also wanted 
them to share his concerns with the accident investigators at the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB), with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and with 
Indonesian civil aviation authorities. (HTIC, 2020, p. 181) 
 
Mr. Pierson never received a response from the Boeing Board of Directors. Less than 
three weeks later the 737 MAX suffered its second fatal crash in less than five months. 
(HTIC, 2020, p. 182) 
There were also listening issues within other departments. 
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In another case, a Boeing AR raised a concern about the impact of erroneous AOA data 
on MCAS, but his query was largely dismissed by his Boeing colleagues, and the 
concern about this issue was not shared with the FAA. While there is no specific 
requirement for ARs to report concerns to the FAA, their potential to do so was further 
precluded from being shared with the FAA in the cases cited above when their Boeing 
colleagues explained away the concerns. (HTIC, 2020, p. 71) 
The recommendation of some of Boeing’s engineers to include safety equipment was rejected 
due to concerns about larger certification requirements. 
Some Boeing engineers, however, strenuously argued that synthetic airspeed was one 
technical feature that may have dramatically improved safety on the 737 MAX if it had 
been installed. Even more chilling was that the Boeing engineer who wrote to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation said that in 2015 his Boeing 
manager argued against including synthetic airspeed on the MAX, reportedly stating, 
“People have to die before Boeing will change things.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 172) 
 
Adding synthetic airspeed would have helped to eliminate these potential conditions that 
could lead to pilot confusion and distraction. However, Boeing chose not to do that. A 
Boeing engineer involved in this issue recently wrote to the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation about his frustrations related to synthetic 
airspeed and other issues regarding the development of the 737 MAX. “I specifically 
advocated for a system that would have enabled” synthetic airspeed to be placed on the 
737, “but upper management shut down the project over cost and training concerns,” he 
wrote. 
The notion of adding synthetic airspeed to the MAX was raised three separate times 
with Boeing managers and rejected on the basis of cost and potential pilot training 
impacts, according to an internal Boeing complaint filed by a Boeing engineer and 
reported on by both the Seattle Times and the New York Times. According to the Seattle 
Times story, Michael Teal cited those reasons when he ultimately made a decision not 
to include synthetic airspeed on the MAX. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 171–172) 
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5.4.6 Theme six: Not taking responsibility 
This theme is about how management at FAA and Boeing blamed others, neglected issues, and 
did not take responsibility for their actions. 
The report shows that management within Boeing had a belief in the process. 
Despite that assessment, the two most senior Boeing officials on the 737 MAX program 
were both extraordinarily reluctant to acknowledge any missteps or mistakes in the 
development of the 737 MAX aircraft. In an interview with Committee staff, Michael 
Teal, the former 737 MAX Vice President, Chief Project Engineer and Deputy Program 
Manager, said: “We believed that we have a safe aircraft as designed, as intended, and 
put out with the designs and training associated with it.” Mr. Teal defended Boeing’s 
work by saying the company followed its process. For example: 
T&I Committee Staff: [B]ecause you followed the process, your testimony is that the 
737 MAX was safe when it was certified. 
Mr. Teal: My testimony, that by defining and delivering and certifying the aircraft, it 
has been determined as safe. That is the process we worked through. (HTIC, 2020, p. 
121) 
 
Keith Leverkuhn, the former General Manager of the MAX program, said he was 
unaware of any efforts to install synthetic airspeed on the MAX until these stories 
appeared in the media. However, during a transcribed interview with Committee staff, 
he said: “[W]hat I can say is that changes to the airplane, we had a very, very detailed 
process associated with any change that was being forwarded to make its way on the 
airplane, and sometimes, those changes were not accepted and it was either due to 
schedule or cost, or frankly, functionality that wasn’t required.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 172) 
At the FAA there were indications that following system processes no longer ensured an 
outcome of integrity because of incomplete information and lack of accountability. 
Moreover, some FAA officials believe the new ODA system limits the information they 
receive in negative ways and that they are not always provided with a clear or complete 
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view of issues that could inform and potentially alter their position on certification 
related issues. According to a story in The Seattle Times, a former Boeing aviation-
safety engineer who worked as a designated engineering representative under the old 
designee oversight system and as an AR under the newer system, indicated that there 
was a dramatic difference between the implied obligations at the core of each system. 
Under the old system, this engineer said “we knew we’d lose our livelihood if we didn’t 
maintain the integrity of making decisions the way the FAA would do it. That check is 
no longer there.” (HTIC, 2020, p. 70) 
At Boeing, not all processes were followed. 
On top of all of the other issues surrounding MCAS and the questions from Boeing’s 
own engineers that appear to have not been thoroughly addressed, MCAS also failed to 
meet several of Boeing’s own design requirements on certain issues. According to the 
Boeing Coordination Sheets regarding MCAS, the Aerodynamics Stability & Control 
Requirements included: 
“MCAS shall not have any objectionable interaction with the piloting of the airplane.” 
“MCAS shall not interfere with dive recovery.” 
In both the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents MCAS failed to meet these design 
requirements. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 119–120) 
The Boeing management were aware of an undue pressure survey, but did not think it was a 
significant issue. 
Both Michael Teal, the former Chief Project Engineer on the 737 MAX program, and 
Keith Leverkuhn, the former Program Manager of the 737 MAX program, 
acknowledged in transcribed interviews with Committee staff that they were aware of 
this internal Boeing survey, but dismissed undue pressure as a significant issue. (HTIC, 
2020, p. 70) 
Instead of investing in safety nets, the cheapest solution for Boeing was to make pilots the safety 
net, even though Boeing knew uncommanded MCAS activation would have catastrophic 
consequences. 
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At the meeting with American Airline pilots, one of the Boeing officials said that despite 
the reports that MCAS was a “single-point failure” system, that was not true because 
they believed the pilots were part of the “system” and essentially served as a backup to 
any technical failure of MCAS. “So the [MCAS] function and trained pilot are part of 
the system,” said one of the Boeing officials. “So rightly or wrongly, that was the design 
criteria, and that’s how they’re being certified with the – the – the system and the pilot 
working together,” he said. (HTIC, 2020, p. 204) 
 
In this case, however, Boeing had internal test data revealing that its own test pilot tried 
– but failed – to respond in time to an uncommanded MCAS activation event in a flight 
simulator which would have resulted in the loss of the aircraft in a real world situation. 
This was not simply a hypothetical scenario. It was the result of a flight simulator test 
by a trained Boeing test pilot. From everything the Committee has learned in its 
investigation, there is no evidence we have found that shows Boeing shared the results 
of that test with the FAA or its 737 MAX customers. Boeing simply assumed away this 
potentially deadly scenario with the false expectation that pilots would be the backup to 
any technical design flaw. Boeing gambled on the fact that the pilots would be the fail-
safe mechanism to prevent an aviation tragedy which contributed to fatal consequences 
in both MAX crashes. (HTIC, 2020, pp. 207–208) 
Between the two crashes, both Boeing and FAA blamed the pilots instead of taking 
responsibility for ensuring flight safety. 
The Committee also examined the response of both Boeing and the FAA after the crash 
of Lion Air flight 610 on October 29, 2018, and before the crash of Ethiopian Airlines 
flight 302 on March 10, 2019. The collective responses in this critical time period were 
woefully inadequate and appeared predisposed to blame the pilots. In the case of the 
FAA, even as evidence mounted that Boeing had not been fully transparent with them 
regarding key data and actions related to issues surrounding Boeing’s analysis of the 
redesigned MCAS system, for instance, the agency failed to take those actions into 
account in regards to its decision to continue to let the 737 MAX fly. 
Instead, as the months moved on and even in the aftermath of the second MAX crash of 
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, the FAA appeared to follow Boeing’s lead on blaming the 
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pilots for both MAX crashes and downplaying the fundamental technical design flaws 
that Boeing designed into the 737 MAX aircraft and that the FAA either did not identify 
or failed to adequately understand prior to its certification of the MAX. (HTIC, 2020, 
pp. 192–193) 
Between the two crashes, the FAA’s own analysis showed that several more crashes statistically 
would occur due to MCAS. Despite this, the Max was allowed to remain flying.  
The analysis was based on the assumption that only one out of 100 pilots would fail to 
react properly to uncommanded MCAS activation resulting in Stabilizer Trim Runaway. 
This seems to be a gross over estimation that predicted 99 out of every 100 pilots would 
correctly respond to this scenario, given the fact that one of Boeing’s own test pilots 
failed to respond quickly enough in a simulator test. It seems the number of potential 
future accidents without a fix to MCAS may have been much higher than these 
predictions assumed.  
Nevertheless, the results of the TARAM analysis indicated that even with the FAA’s 
Emergency AD, but without a fix to MCAS, there could be more than 15 fatal 737 MAX 
crashes over the estimated 30-year lifetime of the fleet, then estimated to be 4,800 
aircraft, resulting in over 2,900 deaths. Statistically this meant that the FAA was 
predicting there would be one fatal 737 MAX accident every two years for the next 30 
years—or one fatal accident roughly every 24 months for the next 360 months. The FAA 
assumed that these potential future crashes would result in the loss of life for everyone 
on board the planes and some bystanders on the ground as well. However, they also 
estimated that Boeing would have a fix for MCAS by July 2019. Until MCAS was fixed, 
however, the aircraft and its passengers were still at risk. 
Despite the TARAM analysis, the FAA permitted the 737 MAX aircraft to continue 
flying. In addition, Boeing continued to expand the MAX fleet in between the time of 
the Lion Air crash in October 2018 and the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March 2019. 
(HTIC, 2020, pp. 210–211) 
Between the two crashes, on November 27, 2018, there was a meeting between Boeing and the 
Allied Pilots Association. One of the APA officials communicated their frustration about the 
lack of transparency. Boeing answered that safety was their first priority.  
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The Boeing official also suggested that regardless of the cause of stabilizer trim 
runaway, whether it was due to MCAS or something else, that the procedures to correct 
that condition were all the same. But a frustrated APA official, referring to the Lion Air 
pilots said, “These guys didn’t even know the damn [MCAS] system was on the airplane 
– These guys didn’t even know the damn system was on the airplane. … [N]or did 
anybody else… that’s the problem I have.” 
Despite the heated exchanges, one of the Boeing officials attempted to emphasize that 
safety was Boeing’s number one priority. 
You’ve got to understand that our commitment to safety is as great as yours. It 
really is. And the worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like this, and 
the—and the even worse thing would be another one. So we have to do all the 
things we can to make sure that this never happens again, and we will, and we 
always do. We have that commitment to safety. 





5.5 Results: Content analysis 
Sample: Nine annual reports (2012–2020) 
Year of annual report Frequency of “safe” Frequency of “$” 
2020 (pp. 1–18) 38 4 
2019 (pp. 1–14) 42 8 
2018 (pp. 1–14) 4 43 
2017 (pp. 1–14) 4 56 
2016 (pp. 1–14) 2 52 
2015 (pp. 1–10) 3 49 
2014 (pp. 1–10) 6 47 
2013 (pp. 1–10) 2 46 




Chapter 6: Case discussion 
In this chapter, I provide a discussion on the Boeing 737 Max case. First, I consider how certain 
issues seemed to be more salient at Boeing than others. Second, I discuss how this affected 
which stakeholders Boeing focused on. Third, I consider how the management at Boeing 
listened to their employees’ concerns. Lastly, I take a holistic overview of the case and consider 
how systemic factors impacted what happened. 
6.1 Salience 
6.1.1 The focus on safety in public discussions 
Boeing’s management has numerous times stated that safety was the company’s highest 
priority. It would be surprising if Boeing’s management did not intellectually understand that 
safety had to be prioritized, considering the long careers of several of Boeing’s managers in the 
aviation industry, which is highly safety-oriented. CEO Muilenburg, for example, had worked 
at Boeing since 1985 in both engineering and managerial positions, and his internal knowledge 
structures must undoubtfully have been impacted by working at a safety organization for such 
an extended period. However, even though managers at Boeing knew that safety was important, 
it appears that this intellectual understanding did not manifest itself into their short-term focus 
and daily operations. 
In fact, there seems to be a distinct difference in managerial focus before and after the Max 
accidents. The thematic analysis illustrates how Boeing time after time prioritized profit over 
safety prior to the second accident. The results from the content analysis show a definite shift 
in managerial communication before and after the accidents. Before the Max accidents, 
financial performance was to a much larger degree addressed in Boeing’s annual reports than 
safety. After the accidents, the opposite pattern emerged. The same pattern is also apparent in 
Boeing’s quarterly reports and proxies to shareholders, even though these were not included in 
the analysis. 
What can explain these findings? One explanation could be, as Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 
(2011) argue, that even though we are aware of our values when we engage in deliberate system 
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2 thinking, we will not necessarily act according to them when an ethical situation arises 
because the situation is framed differently. When managers of Boeing engaged in public 
discussions about safety, the discussions were framed in terms of human lives. As a result, their 
mental representations about the importance of safety were more easily retrieved. In their daily 
operations as managers, however, arising challenges were likely framed as business problems. 
The most accessible knowledge structures were then related to business and financial 
performance, and the problems were addressed accordingly. 
A second explanation could be that we are more likely to pay attention to our moral standards 
when we are reminded of ethical values (Gino et al., 2009). In public discussions about aircraft 
accidents, ethical values become prominent. There is most likely also a spotlight effect of 
getting the public’s attention, which according to Dear et al. (2019) can prime reputational 
concerns. This, in combination with threats of legal action, could most likely increase the 
tendency to “say the right thing” in public discussions. 
6.1.2 The discrepancy between words and actions 
Thirdly, the discrepancy between words and actions seems to be related to the concept of 
salience bias, which is the tendency to focus one’s attention on what is most prominent while 
ignoring equally important information that is less attention-grabbing (The Decision Lab, n.d.). 
One could argue that prior to the first 737 Max accident, safety was not a salient issue at Boeing. 
The public was content with travelling in Boeing airplanes and took safety for granted. Boeing’s 
management had therefore no immediate pressure to deliver on safety. Instead, they were under 
pressure to equalize Airbus’ new competitive edge. Boeing were also suffering financially from 
issues related to their 787 Dreamliner program. This increased the importance of ensuring that 
the 737 Max program would become profitable.  
It appears that achieving financial performance consequently became the priority for managers 
at Boeing. This focus also intensified after Boeing signed Southwest as their customer, since a 
failure to reach the training requirement objective would have led to significant financial 
penalties. The financial bonus and excellence awards that were issued when the training 
objective was reached illustrate that this goal was prioritized. The countdown clocks that were 
installed at one of the production facilities to stress the importance of meeting production targets 
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also illustrate that the Boeing management implemented measures to reach goals of high 
importance for the company’s profitability. 
The 737 Max eventually emerged as the cash cow that Boeing had hoped for. The quarterly 
presentations of Boeing show that the focus on ramping up production to deliver even higher 
returns to shareholders was prominent and that CEO Muilenburg was confident in meeting their 
production commitments and on finding ways to improve on them. However, creating high 
expectations also meant that Muilenburg had to deliver on these promises.  
6.1.3 The pressure felt by managers 
The internal communication at Boeing illustrates the personal pressure managers at Boeing felt 
to deliver on their goals. For example, failing to deliver on the training objective would have 
inflicted large costs on the company, and chief technical pilot Forkner expressed that he thought 
that such a failure would have been thrown squarely on his shoulders. The internal 
communication also shows that strong feelings were involved, and it appears like airliners that 
inquired about simulator training were considered as obstacles to reaching the training 
requirement objectives that had to be overcome. Moreover, failing to reach the production 
targets would have led to negative consequences for airliners that were expecting deliveries and 
would certainly have had a negative impact on the share price. This put pressure on keeping the 
production up, even though there were clear indications that the pace was causing problems. 
It is important to contemplate what implications a failure to deliver on these objectives could 
have become for these managers. A halt in production, a redesign of features, or a failure to get 
the right FAA approvals would have had vivid economic consequences that immediately would 
have become visible. How would the shareholders and the board of Boeing have responded if 
the company’s managers suddenly decided to make adjustments that would have led to such 
costs? Their competence and decision-making abilities would probably have come under 
scrutiny. Their careers would most likely have been negatively impacted. They would most 
likely have felt a loss of face by having to back out of commitments they had confidently made 
in public. They would have felt disappointment by letting down their colleagues that believed 
in their abilities to deliver. Furthermore, they would most likely have been negatively impacted 
economically, for example by not receiving bonuses that reaching certain objectives would have 
qualified them for. Thus, the managers of Boeing had a lot to lose by changing course. Since 
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losses feel twice as painful as the pleasure of gaining something of equal value (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), changing course was most likely an unappealing option. 
This leads me to the hypothesis that the imminence of this potential loss was significantly more 
salient to Boeing managers on a daily basis than concerns about safety. The costs associated 
with changing course could have been easily calculated and put on paper. It would have been 
easy to attribute these costs to an individual manager’s decision. I think these sources of 
potential loss led managers at Boeing to primarily frame problems they faced as financial 
problems instead of safety problems. Forkner’s statement that “but it’s the box we’re painted 
into with the Level B training requirements” (HTIC, 2020, p. 155) and Campbell’s statement 
that “The military is not a profit-making organization” (HTIC, 2020, p. 177) both show signs 
of this tendency. It appears that reaching business objectives were at the center of their mental 
models, and that questioning whether the objectives themselves were reasonable, no longer was 
an easily accessible part of their mental repertories. 
6.1.4 Cost cuts are salient, safety is not 
Moreover, while the negative economic implications of halting production are easily calculated, 
which increases their salience, the positive effects of spending time and money on preventive 
safety measures are almost invisible. Safety usually becomes salient after an accident happens. 
The positive safety benefits of altering the course would therefore have been unclear and harder 
to defend. Similarly, the consequences of reducing time and money on preventive safety 
measures are also to a large degree hidden until an accident happens. The negative impact on 
safety is not necessarily an easily observable characteristic. Negative effects on safety can 
gradually grow and manifest themselves long after the decision is made, and do not necessarily 
become apparent in the short-term. The short-term economic benefit of reducing money and 
time spent on safety, on the other hand, is a number that can be reported at the next quarterly 
meeting as a positive cost-cut measure.  
Thus, there seems to exist a quick, delightful feedback loop for short-term cost cuts. They 
immediately become observable and can be reported as a positive measure at the next quarterly 
presentation. They are likely celebrated and socially rewarded. Spending money on safety, on 
the other hand, creates a feedback loop that feels arduous, where decision-makers must defend 
79 
that they are investing in a preventive measure that—if successful—never will have anything 
tangible to show for itself. 
It also seems like quarterly presentations to shareholders could increase the probability of short-
sightedness and one-dimensional thinking. When shareholders mainly inquire about the 
company’s financials, the CEO must spend a larger portion of their time on this aspect of the 
business. It is an arena where the CEO is put under pressure and held accountable for their 
financial progress. This could prime management into focusing on short-term metrics that give 
them the opportunity to show tangible financial progress. This could increase the risk that 
managers enter choice situations with a mental representation of the world that is overly focused 
on financials. 
6.2 Stakeholder concern 
6.2.1 Solving the wrong problem precisely 
The management of Boeing had to equalize the competitive edge of the Airbus A320 Neo and 
attract airliners that were on the lookout for cost-competitive aircraft. However, it seems like 
the prominence of financial objectives in the mental models of the Boeing management caused 
them to solve the wrong problem. Essentially, they were solving the problem of creating a cost-
effective aircraft in a cost-effective manner, when they actually should have solved the problem 
of creating a safe cost-effective aircraft in a safe cost-effective manner. The management at 
Boeing appears to have been narrowly concerned with two stakeholders: The company’s 
shareholders and the management of airliners who were comparing prices between Boeing and 
Airbus. Consequently, the 737 Max to some degree became an aircraft created by CFOs for 
CFOs. However, creating a new cost-efficient aircraft based on the 737 design, without any 
major changes that would require extensive training for pilots, proved to be challenging. 
Nonetheless, the committee report illustrates Boeing’s determination to overcome obstacles to 
their financial objectives. They failed to meet their own design criteria for safety systems. They 
downplayed the importance of MCAS as a safety-critical system, even though they internally 
knew that uncommanded MCAS activation could lead to catastrophic consequences. They did 
not include safety features and pilot training requirements that had the potential to jeopardize 
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their cost goals. They actively talked airliners out of giving their pilots simulator training. They 
marketed the 737 Max to potential customers as not requiring simulator training, even though 
the FAA still had not made their decision on what the training requirements would be. They 
knowingly delivered 200 Max aircraft to customers with faulty angle-of-attack disagree alerts 
without informing them, and a software update that could have fixed this issue was postponed 
several years because Boeing found it convenient. They ramped up the Max production at the 
factory, even though there were clear indications that the pace was causing quality issues.  
6.2.2 Sacrificing the interests of stakeholders 
While Boeing, at least in the short-term, were successful at the technical dimension of finding 
ways to cut costs, their one-dimensional problem-solving inflicted negative externalities on 
other stakeholders. For example, by not taking care of the interpersonal dimension of the 
problem, Boeing deprived pilots worldwide of safety-critical information. This lack of 
transparency reduced the ability of pilots to deal effectively with issues that could arise. This 
decreased the flight safety of every 737 Max flight, without the awareness of crew and 
passengers, who had no reason to believe that the new 737 Max would be unsafer than older 
generations of the 737 family. 
Boeing’s decisions also proved fatal for 346 human beings, who were deprived of life itself. 
Additionally, Boeing inflicted harm on the families and friends of these 346 individuals, who 
were deprived of people they loved. Reflections about the existential dimension—of human 
dignity—also seem to have been lacking at both Boeing and FAA, since they between the two 
accidents did not take action to fix the flaws of the Max. Instead, Boeing continued ramping up 
deliveries of the Max while blaming the pilots, and the FAA allowed the Max to keep flying, 
despite having made an internal calculation, based on overly optimistic figures, that several 
catastrophic accidents were waiting to happen. 
Another existential aspect was the dignity of employees at both Boeing and the FAA, whose 
concerns and recommendations were overruled and neglected. These employees had a sense of 
pride in their work and could feel the deterioration of quality and integrity in the work that was 
done, while being too small themselves to stop the economic machines their organizations had 
become.  
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Furthermore, the managerial decisions at Boeing disrupted the operations of airliners that had 
the Max as part of their fleet. After the second accident, the grounding of the Max fleet was 
extended several times, and at one point indefinitely. This caused uncertainty and loss of 
livelihood for thousands of aviation professionals who had jobs associated with the Max, 
inflicting stress on them and their families.  
The decisions of Boeing and the FAA also had a systemic dimension. Their lack of integrity 
harmed the public’s trust not only towards the aviation industry, but also towards government 
institutions. Considering that the world already faced severe challenges related to fake news, 
polarization, and institutional honesty, the Max case became another example that could be 
used as proof for living with a general attitude of mistrust. Many airliners also started 
concealing that they had the Max aircraft in their fleet, feeding the dishonesty loop. The Max 
accidents probably also caused more people to travel by car, which is significantly more unsafe 
than commercial air travel, putting these travelers at higher risk of harm. 
6.2.3 Economic consequences 
Ultimately, Boeing’s short-term orientation also proved negative for the company itself and 
those who were shareholders at Boeing in the aftermath of the two crashes. Boeing were 
eventually forced to ground its 737 Max fleet, which inflicted the company billions of dollars 
in increased costs (Gelles, 2020), hurting the share price and the shareholders’ economic 
interests. 
However, any shareholder who was a part of the Max development journey and sold their shares 
prior to the crashes would have been well economically off as a consequence of Boeing’s short-
term financial focus. Managers at Boeing were also economically well-off regardless of the 
crashes. There is no indication that they were forced to pay back the bonuses they had received. 
While CEO Muilenburg voluntarily gave up his 2019 bonus (Reuters, 2020), this seems like 
pure window-dressing, considering that the crashes were the result of decisions that were made 
not only in the year of 2019, but also in every year going back to at least 2011. The development 
process of the 737 Max spanned over two CEOs and certainly a range of different lower-level 
managers. 
This also illustrates the problematic aspects of short-term incentive schemes that do not keep 
managers accountable for the long-term consequences of their decisions. This could be 
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especially problematic at safety organizations since the negative safety implications of 
decisions often take a long time to emerge. The negative effects on safety often manifest 
themselves into latent conditions for failure. Only at a later stage, when sufficient layers of 
safety are broken and line up like holes in a Swiss cheese (Reason, 2000), the adverse effects 
become apparent in the form of an accident. 
6.2.4 Belief in the process 
It is therefore problematic that key managers at Boeing defended their decisions by saying they 
followed the process at the company. What they seem to miss is that their own actions 
negatively impacted the integrity of the process. Since any process could rely on faulty 
assumptions, sound judgment is still needed to evaluate it. 
Nevertheless, cutting only one corner does not necessarily lead to an accident, since other safety 
layers often will prevent an accident from happening. For example, if the pilots of the two 
crashes had been properly informed, or trained, on deactivating MCAS, they would most likely 
have been able to remain in control of the aircraft, even though the MCAS system itself was 
flawed. Similarly, if pilots had not been informed, but the MCAS system relied on two AOA 
sensor inputs instead of only one, this redundancy would have prevented the MCAS system 
from activating based on erroneous input. Likewise, if the FAA had taken proper regulatory 
oversight responsibility, they could have acted as a final safety defense layer by holding Boeing 
appropriately accountable during the development process. 
Unfortunately, cutting one corner was not the case at Boeing. Corners were cut all over the 
place, creating latent conditions for failure that were waiting to line up. In the end, all the short-
term, cost-focused decisions at Boeing eventually added up. However, there were many chances 
for Boeing to create layers of safety if they had prioritized to do so. If managers at Boeing had 
decided to create a safe cost-efficient aircraft, instead of a cost-efficient aircraft, they would 
most likely not have decided on using the old 737 design in the first place, but instead designed 
a new fuel-efficient aircraft based on their engineers’ perceptions of what such an aircraft might 
look like. This could have prevented all the subsequential problems to begin with. 
Even after the Max design was put in stone, opportunities for investing in safety were present. 
For example, Boeing could have scratched the training objective, which would have made it 
easier to include other safety features and provide pilots with proper training. Boeing could 
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have avoided entering into agreements with airliners that economically penalized the company 
for choosing safety over costs. Boeing could have respected the integrity of the FAA and 
provided them with full insight into their processes. 
But Boeing chose otherwise, and safety was not prioritized when decisions were made. This 
illustrates the importance of including safety as a salient perspective, as part of the decision-
makers mental model, in every decision at safety organizations. Even though the safety 
implications of a single decision may seem, or even be, trivial, the aggregate sum of single 
decisions add up and have long-term consequences. If managers do not realize that their 
decisions are part of a bigger whole, they may be tempted to cut corners. However, if this 
happens systematically across different departments, and nobody is keeping an overview of 
how these decisions relate to one another, unexpected consequences could eventually occur and 
hurt the overall interests of the organization (de Waal et al., 2019). The process, which might 
rely on the contribution of several departments, is then compromised. 
6.2.5 Responsibility for the Other 
In addition to believing in a good outcome because the process was followed, managers at both 
FAA and Boeing blamed the pilots for the accidents. Boeing expected pilots to be the fail-safe 
for MCAS system flaws, even though one of Boeing’s own test pilots in a simulator scenario 
had failed to respond quickly enough to uncommanded MCAS activation. One Boeing official 
expressed: “So rightly or wrongly, that was the design criteria, and that’s how they’re being 
certified with the – the – the system and the pilot working together” (HTIC, 2020, p. 204). Even 
though it is problematic that Boeing cut costs at every stage in the process and reduced the 
number of safety layers to one—the pilots—Boeing had not given the pilots sufficient 
information about the safety implications of the MCAS system. As a result, pilots, who were 
the only line of defense left, did not have the information necessary to intervene effectively. If 
Boeing had been transparent about the safety implications of MCAS, pilots would at least have 
had a chance to know the risk they were exposed to. Instead, they were put in a position in 
which they had no choice but to “work together” as the last line of defense with a system they 
did not know was a ticking death trap. 
Løgstrup stated that we in a meeting with another person hold something of their lives in our 
hands (Rabjerg, 2017). This means we have some degree of power over the other person and 
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can influence their lives in a positive or negative manner. According to Løgstrup, we ought to 
act responsibly and use this power to take care of others and help them flourish. It appears that 
key executives at Boeing lacked this ethical perspective. They designed an aircraft where pilots 
were supposed to be the only layer of defense, contrary to sound aviation safety practices, and 
kept pilots in the dark by not sufficiently informing them. Instead of putting pilots in a position 
in which they could thrive, pilots were put in a position in which they became helpless 
observers.  
The behavior of the FAA shows the same pattern of recklessness, when they in the aftermath 
of the first crash figured out that new fatal accidents were waiting to happen, but still allowed 
the 737 Max fleet to keep flying. After the second crash, the FAA also showed irresponsible 
behavior by being one of the last aviation agencies worldwide to ground the 737 Max fleet. The 
Chinese were the first, stating that the two accidents had similar characteristics (Lahiri, 2019). 
The FAA defended their late decision by claiming they were a “data-driven” organization. 
While the FAA waited on what they considered to be data of acceptable quality, they put 
thousands of lives at risk, letting their own pride and Boeing’s economic interests trump the 
concern for human lives.  
Another discomforting pattern also emerged after the second crash. Most airliners completely 
relied on their own aviation agencies’ recommendations instead of making their own risk 
assessment. A few airliners, however, did ground their Max fleet voluntarily as a safety 
precaution (Phys, 2019). One explanation could be that airliners would have been responsible 
for the economic expenses of customers if they initiated the grounding themselves. A grounding 
initiated by an aviation agency, on the other hand, is likely considered a force majeure event, 
relieving the airliners from the economic pressure. Since some airliners have spare capacity at 
other parts of their aircraft fleet and can more easily make new arrangements for affected 
passengers, they can afford to prioritize safety. Some airliners, however, do not have this option. 
This illustrates how short-term concerns about financials could crowd out ethical judgments. 
The decision-making at both Boeing and the FAA illustrates that despite their claims of 
prioritizing safety, safety was never put in the driver’s seat when decisions were made. This 
shows that there is a distinct difference between thinking about safety, talking about safety, and 
doing safety. Aspects such as long-term consequences and concern for others must be salient 
parts of the decision-maker’s mental model and shape the actual decisions that are made. But 
letting these dimensions shape the decision often has a short-term cost. This cost can feel large, 
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be large, and might even require courage to take on. While a decision-maker who acts self-
interestingly and narrow-mindedly might get an immediate reward in form of a positive number 
on a balance sheet, a decision-maker who is able to overcome this tendency may never see the 
positive consequences of their actions. Instead, they receive an immediate penalty in the form 
of negative numbers and criticism from financially affected stakeholders. Still, even though the 
potential long-term savings of human lives remain invisible and unappreciated, these savings 
are both real and of the highest importance. 
6.3 Listening 
6.3.1 Employees had a different focus 
Employees at both Boeing and the FAA expressed many concerns about safety. There were 
over a hundred discrepancy reports related to the Max simulators, and employees expressed 
frustration over a tight schedule that they felt led to substandard quality. Employees at one of 
the Boeing production factories expressed a similar concern over tight schedule pressure that 
they felt led to rushed work. There were also employees who addressed concerns directly 
related to the MCAS system. 
While managers at these two organizations seem to have been most focused on finding ways to 
meet their financial objectives, employees seem to have been more attentive to the impact the 
decisions would have on human beings. The report shows several instances of employees 
expressing a variety of human-oriented concerns. These concerns ranged from how pilots would 
be affected, what information they should receive, the effect of production pressure on human 
error, how the workforce was exhausted, to whether they would put their own families on a 
Boeing plane. It also seems like safety was a substantially more salient concern for regular 
employees than it was for managers. 
What can explain these differences in focus between managers and employees? One 
explanation could be that their jobs are framed differently. Engineers, test pilots, factory 
workers, and technical experts are hired into roles that require attention to quality and safety. 
Their jobs are directly related to creating, designing, and assessing quality and safety issues. 
They are further away from the financial pressure and can better understand and see the negative 
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implications of the decisions their managers make. Thus, they are closer to the real product that 
their customers will receive, and they can directly experience the negative consequences of 
schedule pressure and quality issues. 
6.3.2 Ineffective listening 
Even though their jobs were different, the safety critical information that was required to make 
sound decisions existed within the organizations. Managers should therefore have been able to 
tap into the perspectives of their employees and use this knowledge in their decision-making. 
There are, however, clear indications that managers at Boeing and the FAA did not adequately 
address the concerns their employees expressed. This is apparent in two ways. First, the 
managers’ decisions did not sufficiently incorporate the concerns and recommendations that 
were expressed by technical experts. Instead, their recommendations were overruled by 
management based on cost, schedule, and production concerns. Second, management does not 
seem to have listened to their employees in such a way that they felt heard. 
There are several signs that ineffective listening was a problem at both Boeing and the FAA. 
One example is the answer the factory supervisor Pierson got when he voiced his concerns over 
the schedule pressure at the Boeing factory. When he expressed that “In … military operations, 
if we have these kinds of indications of unstable safety type of things, we would stop” (HTIC, 
2020, p. 177), the manager’s response had been “The military is not a profit-making 
organization” (HTIC, 2020, p. 177). This illustrates what Rogers (1959) called listening with 
an external frame of reference, which is listening from our own subjective perspective without 
empathizing with the other. The manager rejected Pierson by simply stating his own opinion 
on the matter based on his own perception (an ineffective listening behavior). 
Instead, Rogers (1959) recommended that we should tap into the internal frame of reference of 
the other person, attempting to see the world as they see it. For example, if the manager had 
answered something in the lines of “you feel that safety is negatively impacted, and that we 
should stop our operations so that we can catch up”, he would have conveyed an understanding 
of Pierson’s internal frame of reference (an effective listening behavior). If the intent of the 
manager had been to understand Pierson’s concerns, he could have continued the conversation 
and attempted to grasp how Pierson experienced what was going on. It is important to note that 
the manager could have conveyed an understanding of Pierson’s internal frame of reference 
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regardless of whether he himself agreed or disagreed with Pierson, and regardless of whether 
he would act on the information Pierson gave him. Listening in this way would have had two 
positive outcomes. First, the manager could have gained a better understanding of Pierson’s 
concerns and perhaps used this new understanding to extend his own mental representations of 
the problem. Second, Pierson would have felt that his views were acknowledged and 
understood. He would have felt that the reality, as he saw it, was understood by another person. 
Instead, Pierson eventually left the organization, with feelings of alienation and resentment, 
because he did not feel that his concerns were being taken seriously.  
There are also other statements that show signs of ineffective listening. For example, in a safety 
survey at the FAA, one employee wrote that “There is no acknowledgement of 
recommendations made by experts or an explanation about why a different decision was made” 
(HTIC, 2020, p. 69). A Boeing employee working on the Max simulators expressed: “[T]hey 
are ploughing forward regardless of the danger, failing to appreciate the implication of Boeing 
failing to qualify a Boeing device” (HTIC, 2020, p. 160) and: “They are failing to appreciate 
that a delay would be less costly than the incurred costs” (HTIC, 2020, p. 160).  
These examples illustrate that employees did not feel heard. Managers do not seem to have 
acknowledged the internal frame of reference of these employees and showed them that they 
understood their concerns. And there also seems to have been a lack of explanations for why 
the employees’ recommendations were not used in the actual decision-making. This seems to 
have led to feelings of consent, frustration, and demoralization among employees at both 
Boeing and the FAA. For example, employees at the FAA expressed that “There is no respect 
for an expert culture that has existed through years of experience” (HTIC, 2020, p. 69), and 
another expressed that “they don’t understand the true risks of the decisions they are making; 
they are making decisions that they don’t have a clue about” (HTIC, 2020, p. 69). There are 
also several other examples that illustrate employees’ negative affect towards managers they 
did not feel took their concerns seriously. 
Not having one’s experience validated by others can make us feel disconnected and alienated 
(Rogers, 1980/1995). If managers within Boeing and the FAA persistently showed a lack of 
ability to acknowledge the viewpoints their subordinates expressed, and if they consistently 
failed to convey an accurate understanding of their employees’ viewpoints back to them, this 
can likely explain some of the frustration and consent employees were experiencing. It is likely 
that the basic psychological needs of these employees were negatively affected by these 
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ineffective listening behaviors (see Figure 3). The employees saw quality standards not being 
met, safety issues not being sufficiently addressed, and production pressure leading to errors. 
They had standards of excellence and a sense of pride in their work. When their managers made 
decisions that compromised these standards, some employees spoke up, but management was 
not willing to explore their perspectives. Instead, their concerns were trivialized, and they were 
forced to implement the decisions of managers who they felt did not truly understand the issues 
at hand. Hence, they lost their sense of competence since managers overruled their expert 
opinions. They lost their sense of autonomy because they were forced to do substandard work. 
And they lost their sense of relatedness as they could no longer see themselves as being part of 
an organization of the highest integrity.  
This failure of effective listening deprived employees of dignity. According to de Colle et al. 
(2017) it is essential that people get the opportunity to fill their roles with their own humanity—
if they are to be alive, present, authentic human beings who feel passion and fulfillment. 
However, at Boeing and FAA, the complexities of the employees who spoke up were not 
acknowledged, respected, or nurtured. Instead, they were treated as static parts of an economic 
machine, as means to a financial outcome.  
6.3.3 Lack of self-awareness 
Even though employees at both Boeing and FAA expressed concerns about safety issues, 
managers at both Boeing and FAA claimed they were unaware of many of these issues in the 
aftermath of the crashes. Whether this is true is impossible to know. Concerns about legal and 
reputational concerns could of course influence the truthfulness of such statements, but it could 
also be correct that managers were unaware to some degree.  
One explanation that could explain why managers felt they were unaware, could be that their 
mental models consistently distorted data to fit in with their preconceptions. Data that conflicted 
with their own goals was distorted or ignored. This could also explain why employees’ concerns 
were not taken into consideration. Managers immediately evaluated incoming data based on 
their own views of the world and dismissed conflicting data as irrelevant or wrong. Thus, their 
own narrow-mindedness and lack of ability to take in other perspectives might have led them 
into a state of unawareness. This means that the available data was accessible right in front of 
them, but that the mental aspect of their listening was ineffective and reduced their 
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comprehension of the data (see Figure 3, instrumental effect, which is moderated by the 
effectiveness of the listening).  
According to Rogers (1961/2012), all of us fear change. Understanding someone else requires 
courage: We might be changed if we dare to tap into the internal frame of reference of someone 
else. Rogers also emphasized that a lot of our suffering is caused by our inability to properly 
communicate with ourselves. If we deny ourselves access to parts of our inner lives, we will be 
unaware of how unconscious thoughts distort our perception. If these managers lacked 
sufficient self-awareness, they might have been unaware of how their own perception of reality 
distorted incoming data streams. Thus, their decision-making might have become flawed 
because their ineffective listening skills did not enable them to access the rich world of valuable 
data that their technical experts possessed. Consequently, they entered choice situations with 
severe blind spots.  
6.3.4 Psychological safety and human needs 
Another explanation could be that managers failed to create a psychological safe climate where 
employees could speak up. Considering the pressure these managers were under, illustrated by 
the strong emotions they expressed when their goals were in danger of being jeopardized, 
employees might have feared that they would become an obstacle to these highly important 
goals if they were to express themselves openly. Low psychological safety could lead to a 
reduction in voice behaviors such as disagreeing and giving candid feedback (Newman et al., 
2017), and as a result it might be the case that some of the employee concerns were not properly 
communicated to management. However, as managers in a safety organization, they had a 
responsibility to become informed by actively creating a climate in which employees could 
openly express themselves, for example through respectful inquiry or other supporting 
behaviors.  
Based on the committee report, it seems like such a safe climate did not exist. Instead, there are 
clear indications that employees feared retributions and negative consequences for talking 
openly. If employees’ basic needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness were thwarted 
by negative interactions with management, this could have caused employees to feel a 
controlled type of motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2008), which has been shown to cause avoidant 
and defensive interaction behaviors (La Guardia & Patrick, 2008). A survey within the FAA 
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showed that 49 percent of the respondents believed that safety concerns would not be addressed 
(HTIC, 2020, p. 69), and employees might eventually have stopped expressing concerns 
because they expected that they would not be listened to. 
Thus, it may be that managers were partly unaware, but that this was caused by their own 
neglect of creating a climate in which employees would feel safe to speak up. Consequently, 
through ineffective supportive listening behaviors, they got access to less data (see Figure 3). 
The data they did not get access to could potentially have altered their mental models prior to 
entering choice situations (see Figure 1) by making other dimensions than the technical and 
other stakeholders than shareholders become more salient (see Figure 2). 
6.4 A holistic view 
6.4.1 The system versus the individual 
Ultimately, the decision-makers at Boeing and the FAA failed to treat stakeholders with dignity. 
They seem to have failed to put themselves into the shoes of their employees and get a thorough 
understanding of their concerns and interests. They seem to have failed to realize the power 
they had over stakeholders that depended on them. They seem to have failed to listen to their 
own inner voices and figure out how the salience of financial issues affected their ability to 
think long-term and holistically. Even though it is easy to blame these managers for 
recklessness and attribute the accidents to their lack of judgment, other contributing factors 
should also be considered. Because the pattern of this case is not unique. 
For example, to consider some other recent cases, a contributing factor to the KNM Helge 
Ingstad accident was lack of competent personnel (Johansen et al., 2021). This was caused by 
a lean manning concept that had been implemented to keep personnel costs as low as possible. 
While this likely led to some millions in cost savings on the personnel budget, these costs are 
of course completely insignificant compared to the costs of the accident. First, replacing the 
ship would cost billions of Norwegian kroner. Second, the accident reduced the Norwegian 
military’s ability to participate in its core role of protecting Norwegian interests. Third, the 
accident had a real potential for significant loss of human lives. Fourth, the accident has 
inflicted harm on all the people who were involved in it, who were put in a position in which 
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they were worse off than they could have been if an investment in their competence and abilities 
had been prioritized.  
Another example is how cost cuts have negatively impacted maintenance routines at Equinor 
(Holter, 2021), which has increased the risk of accidents that could cause significant harm to 
ecological interests. The costs that are saved are of course completely insignificant compared 
to the potential negative consequences such accidents could inflict on the environment and 
human lives.  
These cases seem to share many of the same characteristics: Managers who are put under 
pressure to deliver financial results, a lack of an effective and independent regulatory authority 
that keeps organizations accountable, and large organizational size and complexity. These 
conditions seem to increase the risk of corner cutting and silo thinking, where safety layers 
slowly are torn apart.  
Just as Boeing put pilots in a position in which they were doomed to fail, there are systemic 
factors that seem to put managers in positions in which they are more prone to making unwise 
decisions. Systemic factors prime managers into short-sightedness by primarily holding them 
accountable for financial performance, for example through quarterly financial updates (in 
contrast: where is the requirement of quarterly safety updates for safety organizations?). In 
addition, the widespread use of economic incentives schemes may crowd out existential, social, 
and ecological values, and thereby reduce managers’ ability to act holistically (Ims et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the social system influences how we perceive the world around us. Goal-oriented, 
authority-pleasing behavior is rewarded from early childhood, and through repeated exposure 
to mass media we acquire materialistic mindsets that cause us to believe that economic wealth 
is the highway to happiness. We bring these perceptions of the world with us into organizations 
and fail to realize that our obsession with increasing profits could be the result of the social 
interactions and environment we have been exposed to. If we fail to question our own 
perception of the world, we risk becoming a deterministic product of our surroundings. 
Therefore, when we blame these managers for their wrongdoings, we must not forget that we, 
through our own values, actions, and focus, have contributed to the social system that has 




Even though it is easy to criticize the decision-making at Boeing and the FAA, it is important 
to remember that it is easier to see the wrongdoings and how they are connected after an 
accident has happened. The decisions that led to the two crashes happened over a time-period 
of at least eight years. Seeing all the decisions put together as a narrative in a single report 
intensifies the perception that “they should have known better”. While the weaknesses of these 
decisions may seem obvious in the aftermath, the unintended consequences of the decisions 
were most likely far from obvious at the time they were made. 
It is also important to consider the context of the communication excerpts. It is easy to use them 
to argue for a ruthless business-focus. This might be the correct explanation, but caution is 
warranted, since a lot of internal communication has not been published, which could have 
contained signs of another pattern. In addition, managers at Boeing had to find solutions to their 
business problems, and it is natural that this led to business-oriented discussions. Discussing 
whether a safety feature really is necessary is a valid conversation to have. Obviously, there is 
a trade-off somewhere between what is needed and what is obsolete, and finding this trade-off 
is important for a business in a competitive market.  
The communication excerpts also show examples of strong expressions of emotion, such as 
frustration, annoyance, and consent, sometimes directed at other stakeholders. It is important to 
note that these communication excerpts can be interpreted in several ways and that this affects 
the narrative. For example, when one of the managers calls one of the airline customers an idiot 
for inquiring about simulator training, this could be interpreted as an expression of annoyance 
that important goals were being jeopardized. However, if this manager genuinely thought that 
simulator training was unnecessary, that he undoubtedly thought that the 737 Max was of such 
high quality that these airline customers simply were wasting their money on requesting extra 
training, the narrative changes from something ruthless to something that appears more 
empathetic. 
We must also remember that the persons behind these statements communicated internally with 
their co-workers, and that the internal communication never was intended for public release. 
Strong emotions are a natural part of anyone’s work life, as well as life in general. These internal 
communication excerpts simply show something that is common to all of us: a need for 
expressing our inner emotions and being met with understanding. Most of us have had more 
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disturbing thoughts than these examples illustrate. Luckily for us, our thoughts or close 
conversations with others are not made available for public condemnation. There are, of course, 
differences between merely thinking something, expressing thoughts to others, and actually 
deciding things that negatively impact others. Suppressing our inner life is, however, probably 
not a constructive solution. Instead, by tapping into it, by listening to ourselves without 
judgment, we might become aware of how our perception of reality is distorted, and, as Rogers 
(1961/2012) stated, create the possibility for internal change. This might also be the starting 




Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 Research question 
This thesis has explored the role of listening and mental models for ethical decision-making. 
Based on a review of the literature, a model on listening was proposed. This model suggests 
that the effectiveness of a decision-maker’s listening affects how much data the decision-maker 
gets access to and how much of the data the decision-maker will accurately understand. The 
model postulates that interactions with stakeholders provide opportunities for the decision-
maker to modify their own mental model of the world and fill in their own blind spots. This 
could increase the decision-maker’s ability to make a holistic decision that takes into 
consideration a broad range of stakeholders and multiple dimensions of a problem. The model 
also proposes that the effectiveness of a decision-maker’s listening influences the degree to 
which a stakeholder is treated with dignity, which implies that effective listening could be 
important for ethical leadership in general. 
Specifically, the listening model proposes that the mental aspect of a decision-maker’s listening 
impacts how accurately the decision-maker will understand what the stakeholder has expressed. 
The interpersonal aspects of the decision-maker’s listening could impact the stakeholder’s 
psychological safety and needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, which in turn 
affects the degree to which the stakeholder is willing to express their interests and concerns 
openly, thereby influencing how much data the decision-maker gets access to. However, it can 
also affect whether the stakeholder feels safe in expressing their true selves in the relationship 
without having to hide behind a mask. The degree to which basic psychological needs are 
supported could also influence whether the stakeholder feels an autonomous or controlled type 
of motivation, which has implications for their well-being. Hence, decision-makers should care 
about effective listening not only because they could gain access to decision-relevant data, but 
also because it could be a way of treating stakeholders with dignity and as ends in themselves. 
The Boeing 737 Max case illustrates how external stressors could prime decision-makers into 
thinking too narrowly. Short-term financial pressure from powerful stakeholders could reduce 
the ability of decision-makers to take responsibility for negative externalities that might be 
inflicted upon other stakeholders in the long run. Feelings of pressure and a consistent focus on 
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short-term, tangible results could cause decision-makers to consider too few stakeholders and 
dimensions of the problems they face.  
Ineffective listening seems to be one potential contributor to the flawed decision-making at 
Boeing and the FAA. The data needed to make responsible decisions existed at both 
organizations, but managers failed to use the data in their decision-making. Two possible 
explanations for this have been offered in this thesis. First, managers’ ineffective listening 
behaviors seem to have contributed to a psychologically unsafe climate, in which employees 
did not feel they could openly express themselves. This also appears to have negatively 
impacted employees’ basic psychological needs, creating feelings of consent and frustration. 
These factors could have reduced employees’ willingness to openly share concerns with 
management in a candid way. Second, the executives’ focus on financials could have been such 
a prominent aspect of their mental models that their ability to listen effectively to their 
employees suffered. Employee concerns might have been distorted or neglected to fit in with 
the managers’ pre-existing beliefs. As a result, the managers failed to modify their own mental 
models, fill in their own blind spots, and take a broader set of dimensions and stakeholders into 
consideration when decisions were made. 
In sum, the main findings of this study are as follows: 
• The effectiveness of a decision-maker’s listening could impact a stakeholder’s 
psychological safety and their basic needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
as well as the degree to which they feel they can be their true selves in the relationship. 
• The effectiveness of a decision-maker’s listening could impact how much data the 
decision-maker gets access to from a stakeholder and how much of that data the 
decision-maker will accurately understand. This affects the degree to which the 
decision-maker can fill in their own blind spots and make ethical decisions that take into 
consideration a broad range of stakeholders and dimensions. 
• External stressors, priming, and framing effects could affect which stakeholders and 
dimensions a decision-maker considers. 
• The decision-maker’s self-awareness will affect their ability to overcome rigid thinking, 
extend their own mental models with new perspectives, fill in their own blind spots, and 




Many organizations are becoming increasingly more diverse and specialized. They face 
challenges that require expertise from a broad range of disciplines. If leaders are to utilize the 
competencies and perspectives of their workforce, they need to actively engage with the talent 
pool they have available. Leaders who listen ineffectively will, to some degree, let these 
resources go untapped as divergences from the leader’s pre-existing schemas are likely to be 
dismissed. Therefore, being able to temporarily suspend judgment and see the world as 
someone else sees it could be an important ability to have in order to reap the benefits from 
having a diverse set of perspectives available.  
Employees are also increasingly expecting more from their organizations than pay. They expect 
to do meaningful work and be actively involved. As effective listening is one way of supporting 
the basic psychological needs of employees, it could be an important contributor to increasing 
the probability that employees will enjoy working for an organization and that they will feel an 
autonomous type of motivation. This is positive for both the organization, which might 
experience increased performance, and the individual, who might feel a higher sense of 
satisfaction in their work. 
New technology and rapid changes in the external environment require organizations to adapt 
more quickly than before. Many change processes fail, and effective listening is one aspect that 
leaders should consider when planning and implementing change measures. Employees who 
do not feel heard could start feeling cynicism toward their organization, reducing organizational 
performance, individual well-being, and the likelihood of successful change. Leaders who are 
able to listen effectively to their employees, acquiring an accurate understanding of their 
interests and concerns, and convey this understanding back to their employees to show them 
that they indeed have understood their interests and concerns correctly, might be able to achieve 
more successful change processes. 
As a society, we have become more aware of negative externalities that organizations inflict on 
their surroundings. Understanding and considering the needs and concerns of a broad range of 
stakeholders require leaders who feel a sense of responsibility beyond their narrow self-
interests. If we can listen to ourselves and become aware that we are seeing the world through 
only one of several available lenses, we might feel an increased sense of empathy and 
humbleness toward others. By putting ourselves in our stakeholders’ shoes, seeing the world as 
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they do, contemplating John Rawls’ veil of ignorance, and realizing that we just as well could 
have been our stakeholders, we can use our power to take their needs into consideration.  
However, ethical scandals do repeatedly occur. As faulty judgment is a common and predictable 
characteristic of human nature, this calls for finding systemic ways of priming decision-makers 
to consider the long-term interests of a broad set of stakeholders. Shareholders and government 
authorities must act responsibly by creating conditions that reduce the likelihood that leaders 
feel pressured to sacrifice ecological, spiritual, and social values for short-term financial 
performance. Schools and families must act responsibly by encouraging multi-dimensional 
thinking from a young age, increasing the likelihood that the business leaders of tomorrow have 
flexible and critical thinking skills as an ingrained part of their being. 
As individuals, we must become mindful of the fact that we perceive the world around us 
through our own mental models. We must question our beliefs, realize that we have blind spots, 
and be open to exploring the perspectives of others. We should also increase our ability to 
recognize how external stressors affect us, which could help us counter the tendency of 
becoming narrowly fixated on issues that appear urgent and salient. Through increased self-
awareness, we can become more proactive and flexible in our thinking, which could increase 
our ability to actively reframe situations, consider multiple viewpoints, and ultimately make 
wiser decisions. 
7.3 Future research 
In this thesis, I defined effective listening based on Rogers’ listening construct, which consists 
of several variables (comprehension, attentiveness, and interpersonal aspects). For future 
research, it could be useful to break down the construct and consider the variables 
independently.  
This thesis explored listening in the context of ethical decision-making. It would also be 
interesting to research listening in the context of organizational change. Common ways of 
creating readiness for change include engaging in persuasive communication, providing 
employees with information about the change, and creating opportunities for participation in 
the change process (Armenakis & Harris, 2002). The literature on organizational change often 
focuses on selling the change to employees, creating a sense of urgency, and convincing 
98 
 
employees that the change is appropriate and necessary (Armenakis & Harris, 2009). However, 
resistance to change is common, and many change processes fail.  
Therefore, it would be interesting to study the effectiveness of leaders listening when they 
embark on selling the change efforts to their employees. Do leaders acknowledge and convey 
an understanding of the views their employees express, or do they simply focus on arguing for 
the benefits of the change? Could change processes be negatively impacted when leaders fail 
to acknowledge the perspectives of their employees? How is resistance to change affected when 
employees feel that their manager has correctly conveyed an understanding of the perspectives 
they have shared? Could this reduce the probability of change cynicism and potentially increase 
change readiness? Could this increase mutual learning and reduce the likelihood of leaders 
embarking on change efforts that are likely to fail?  
In some cases, painful changes must be implemented. This thesis has proposed that the 
effectiveness of a decision-maker’s listening could impact the basic psychological needs of 
stakeholders. How are such hurtful change processes affected by the effectiveness of a leader’s 
listening? Could effective listening help employees cope better with change? Could effective 
listening be a way of maintaining healthy relationships within the organization, even though 
the change itself is perceived as negative? Such questions, where leaders lead change processes 
through dialogue, perspective-taking, and perspective-giving instead of manipulative, 
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